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INTRODUCTION
As the United States has engaged in an unprecedented campaign of tar-
geted killings against members of al-Qaeda and associated forces, various
agencies within the government have engaged in increasingly pitched squab-
bling regarding their respective control over drone strikes in multiple foreign
theaters.' Authority and responsibility has vacillated between the Central Intel-
t Professor of Law, Comell Law School. I am grateful to Thomas Mills of the Comell Law
School library for research assistance. The following individuals provided feedback and advice: William
Banks, Robert Chesney, Mike Dorf, Charlie Dunlap, Matt Evangelista, Kevin Heller, Marty Lederman,
Sarah Kreps, Steve Vladeck, John Witt, and participants in my Jurisprudence of War seminar.
1. For a description of the conflict, see Carlo Munoz, Turf Battle Builds Quietly in Congress
over Control of Armed Drone Program, THE HILL (Apr. 9, 2013), http://thehill.com
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ligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Department's Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC), the former being an intelligence agency tasked with both
intelligence and covert operations directives, and the latter a military organiza-
2tion under the direction of the Secretary of Defense. In addition to the inherent
policy questions in this turf battle, there are urgent elements of domestic and
international law simmering beneath the surface. Some critics have suggested
that CIA officers should not be involved in drone operations because CIA of-
ficers are non-uniformed individuals that do not meet the international law
standards for privileged belligerency.3 According to this argument, the calculus
regarding the appropriate agency for drone operations ought to take into ac-
count that international law does not confer the combatant's privilege on non-
uniformed CIA employees.4
A competing school of thought disagrees with this analysis on the
grounds that privileged belligerency-as a legal concept-is entirely a creature
of international armed conflict (IAC) and therefore has no relevance in a non-
international armed conflict (NIAC).5 Since the parties to the armed conflict
include a non-state actor, al-Qaeda, the armed conflict cannot be an IAC. 6 Un-
der this view, the appropriate legal categories are government forces and oppo-
sition fighters, not privileged and un-privileged belligerents.7 1 describe this as
the orthodox position under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) because it is
often asserted in classic texts that the privilege of belligerency does not apply
in NIAC, and the drafters of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol
/homenews/administration/292501 -turf-battle-builds-quietly-over-control-of-armed-drone-program-.
2. See Fred Kaplan, The Drones Are in the Details: Why it Matters if the Pentagon Takes
Command of the CIA's Drones, SLATE (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
_and_politics/war-stories/2013/03/johnbrennanwants thejpentagonto take command of the cia s
drone strike.html.
3. Gary Solis, CIA Drone Attacks Produce America's Own Unlawful Combatants, WASH.
POST, Mar. 12, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/11/AR201003
1103653.html.
4. The privilege of belligerency is the right of all lawful combatants to kill enemy soldiers
without criminal liability. In this Article, the terms "privilege of belligerency" and "privilege of combat-
ancy" are used interchangeably.
5. See NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 323 (2008) ("Current
conventional IHL governing non-international armed conflict [(NIAC)] does not use the notion of 'com-
batant,' nor does it provide for combatant privilege within the meaning of immunity from prosecution
for lawful acts of war."); GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 191 (2010) (noting that in NIAC there "may be combat in the literal
sense, but in terms of LOAC there are fighters, rebels, insurgents, or guerrillas who engage in armed
conflict, and there are government forces, and perhaps armed forces allied to the government forces");
Knut Dormann, Combatants, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 268,
269-70 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009); Ryan Goodman, Good Reasons May Exist to Close CIA Drone
Program-But Claim That CIA Agents Are "Unprivileged Belligerents" Is Not One of Them, JUST
SECURITY (Sept. 25, 2013, 11:25 AM), http://justsecurity.org/l 150/good-reasons-exist-close-cia-drone
-program-but-claim-cia-agents-unprivileged-belligerents ("These particular privileges and immunities
have no relevance to non-international armed conflict.").
6. See, e.g., Noam Lubell, The War (?) Against Al-Qaeda, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 421, 431 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012) ("The short answer to this
proposition would be that international armed conflict must be between two (or more) States, and since
Al-Qaeda is not a State, we do not have an international armed conflict.").
7. See, e.g., Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United
Against Terrorism, 45 TEX. INT'L L.J. 323, 343 (2009) (claiming that there is no category of combatant
in NIACs); see also SOLIS, supra note 5, at 191.
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II refused to codify one.
8
The orthodox position is mistaken and the original critics have it right:
there is something wrong with CIA employees engaging in drone strikes. How-
ever, CIA critics have opposed the agency's participation for the wrong rea-
sons. CIA employees lose the privilege of belligerency because their actions are
covert and unacknowledged-a type of force never consistent with the privilege
of belligerency.9 Strangely, the current literature on lHL has consistently
avoided this issue, demonstrating a blind spot with regard to covert action.'0
Simply put, covert action is incompatible with the privilege of belligerency be-
cause the privilege is a collective-not individual-privilege and can only be
asserted if a collective fighting force first acknowledges the use of force and
confirms that the appropriate individuals fight on its behalf." Without this nec-
essary step, there is no privilege for the individual to assert.
Before proceeding with this argument, we must first address the threshold
question of whether the privilege of cornbatancy applies to the armed conflict
with al-Qaeda. There are already calls to recognize the privilege of belligerency
in the context of transnational NIACs, based on the argument that transnational
NIACs cross international boundaries and therefore, by analogy, ought to im-
port the legal architecture of IACs, including the privilege of combatancy.
2
This Article advances a stronger position: the privilege of belligerency might
8. See 1 INT'L COMM. ON RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW:
RULES 11, 384 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter ICRC,
CUSTOMARY IHL RULES] (stating that "[c]ombatant status ... exists only in international armed con-
flicts" and that "[s]tate practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable
in international armed conflicts"); Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case
Study in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 41
(2010) (asking whether concept of combatant can be disaggregated into combatant for purposes of privi-
leged belligerent and combatant for the purpose of the principle of distinction); David Kretzmer, Target-
ed Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16
EURO. J. INT'L L. 171, 197-98 (2005) (concluding that the principle of distinction in NIACs requires
combatants, though they remain u privileged).
9. Covert action is defined in U.S. law as "an activity or activities of the United States Gov-
ernment to influence the political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the
role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly .... " 50 U.S.C. §
3093 (2012).
10. The closest discussion is a section on spies in the famous article by Baxter. See RICHARD
BAXTER, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, in HUMANIZING THE
LAWS OF WAR: SELECTED WRITINGS OF RICHARD BAXTER 37, 41-42 (Detlev F. Vagts et al. eds., 2013)
(concluding that spies are unprivileged and prosecutable under domestic law); see also EMILY
CRAWFORD, THE TREATMENT OF COMBATANTS AND INSURGENTS UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 53-54 (2010) (addressing the consequences of denial of combatant status).
11. For literature recognizing the collective nature of belligerent rights, see Nils Melzer, The
Principle of Distinction Between Civilians and Combatants, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 296, 303 (Andrew Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014)
(concluding that combatant privilege and POW status are tied to collective criteria and entitlements).
Compare Christopher Kutz, The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law and
War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 148, 173 (2005) (defending the collective approach), with JEFF MCMAHAN,
KILLING IN WAR 81 (2009) (rejecting the collective approach in favor of individual analysis of moral
rights in warfare).
12. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable: Has the Time Come To Offer Combatant
Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 253, 272 (2011) (proposing extension of
privilege to non-state actors in transnational NIACs). Corn argues that transnational NIACs are de facto
international conflicts and should be afforded the privilege of combatancy, just as national wars of liber-
ations were treated as international conflicts though technically internal in nature.
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 40: 337
apply in more traditional NIACs, including civil wars, because the deep struc-
ture of the law of war permits armed fighting groups to engage in war against
each other, regardless of whether the armed groups constitute states. The only
reason to deny this claim is to fall victim to rank statism. Of course, it would be
foolish to argue that this principle is embodied in customary international law
since most states (or at least their official statements) reject the right of rebels
to engage in combatancy against the state. This Article concludes that these
statements are either mistaken or exaggerated and that if states understood the
deep structure of the law of war, they might be less categorical in their state-
ments.13 In particular, statements regarding the exclusion of the privilege in
NIACs often rely on the Geneva Conventions. However, as will be demonstrat-
ed in Part I, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is often misread in
this regard: In fact it neither explicitly codifies nor proscribes the combatant's
privilege. Rather, it merely preserves the status quo, and so to understand the
post-Geneva combatant's privilege one needs to understand the pre-Geneva
privilege and look to nineteenth century practices. In keeping with this analysis,
Part II examines U.S. Civil War practices and the writings of the nineteenth-
century publicists and finds strong precedent for applying the privilege in some
NIACs. At the very least, the standard proposition that the privilege never ap-
plies in NIACs is an unsupported exaggeration.
The argument in this Article lingers in the netherworld between lex lata
and lexferenda, between the law as it currently stands and the law as it ought to
be. The goal of the analysis is to identify the implicit structure of the law, even
though it remains unacknowledged in positive international law as defined by a
standard interpretation of international law sources. However, structure should
never be ignored and here especially so. If the proper structure was recognized,
it might become manifest in positive law and trigger a broader understanding of
the privilege of belligerency.
The obvious objection is that states have always maintained-and con-
tinue to maintain-the right to prosecute rebels for taking up arms against the
government. This would suggest that the privilege does not apply in NIACs.
However, the literature has generally viewed such prosecutions without suffi-
cient detail to their criminal content. As this Article will show, there is a
marked difference between prosecuting a rebel for murder and prosecuting a
rebel for treason or taking up arms against the government. Under the view ad-
vanced below, the privilege of combatancy negates the former but not the latter.
Even with the privilege of combatancy in force in a NIAC, states may still
prosecute rebels for loyalty-based offences stemming from their decision to re-
bel against the government; the privilege simply prevents the government from
prosecuting them for murder. The privilege transforms what would otherwise
be an illegal act of murder into a lawful act of belligerency, but it does not ex-
cuse the rebel from his or her constitutional or domestic obligation of loyalty to
the government. While this distinction may appear razor thin, it is sufficiently
13. See SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 515
(2012) ("Although states may prove resistant to the idea, there is some practice suggesting that the prin-
ciple of combatant immunity can be applied in certain non-international armed conflicts.").
2015] The Combatant's Privilege in Asymmetric and Covert Conflicts 341
robust to carry the conceptual weight of the argument. States may recognize the
privilege but also, in some situations, prosecute rebels.
In Part V, this Article then examines the particular mode of military en-
gagement--covert action-most commonly used in the armed conflict with
non-state terrorist groups. This requires interrogating a second orthodoxy of
IHL: that unacknowledged use of force is consistent with the privilege of com-
batancy. Under the orthodox position, Defense Department forces, wearing tra-
ditional uniforms and military insignia, could be assigned to a covert action as-
signment authorized by the President under Title 50 of the U.S. Code.14 This
was the structure of the Navy SEAL raid against Osama Bin Laden in Abbotta-
bad, Pakistan, that was carried out by traditional military forces under the oper-
ational command of CIA Director Leon Panetta pursuant to Title 50.15 It was
generally assumed that the privilege of belligerency survived this migration
from Title 10 (Department of Defense authority) to Title 50 (covert action).
16
This view is mistaken, as long as the use of force remains unacknowledged.
17
The reasons for this conclusion are two-fold. First, the privilege requires that
the individual belong to a fighting force that carries its arms openly and wears a
distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance.18 Carrying arms openly is im-
possible when the use of force is unacknowledged. Second, the distinctive em-
blem cannot be a generic military uniform; it must unambiguously identify the
soldier as a member of a particular fighting force. This conclusion is supported
by the underlying objective of the insignia requirement, which is not simply to
distinguish civilians and soldiers in the generic sense but also to distinguish en-
emy soldiers from friendly soldiers and neutral third parties.
Often the military force-say the deployment of a drone-might be a
coordinated effort with a mix of CIA and uniformed Defense Department ac-
tors working together.19 This too represents an under-theorized problem. Sec-
tion V.E will therefore address how the concept of carrying arms openly ap-
plies to complex weapons platforms with multiple individuals engaged
cooperatively in their deployment. The concept of carrying arms openly applies
in a simple way when the weapon is a rifle. But when a team of combatants in
multiple locations co-deploys the armament, the question becomes how to
evaluate the mixed nature of the team with uniformed and non-uniformed per-
14. See 50 U.S.C. § 3093 (2012).
15. For a helpful analysis, see generally Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence
and the Law of the Title 1O/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 539, 539 (2012) (arguing that
the Bin Laden raid exemplifies an increasing convergence of military and intelligence activities); Andru
E. Wall, Demystifying the TitlelO-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Ac-
tivities & Covert Action, 3 HARv. NAT'L SECURITY J. 85, 85-86 (2011) (same).
16. Title 10 gives the Secretary of Defense control and authority over the armed forces. See 10
U.S.C. § 113(b) (2012).
17. There is a factual argument that the U.S. government subsequently acknowledged the use
of force in President Barack Obama's presidential address, which might arguably have rescued the privi-
lege of combatancy retrospectively. See Peter Baker et al., Bin Laden Is Dead, Obama Says, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-killed.html.
18. Some scholars argue that these requirements do not apply to regular armed forces, a view
that is rejected in Section I.B.
19. See Chesney, supra note 15, at 562 (noting the presence of a shadow war with CIA assets
working alongside military assets in the armed conflict against al-Qaeda).
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sonnel. The best reading of the underlying principle of openness in warfare en-
tails that a mix of overt and covert operatives in the deployment of a complex
weapons system is not "open" and therefore will negate the combatant's privi-
lege.
Both the argument regarding the privilege of belligerency in NIACs and
the argument regarding covert action are unorthodox according to the received
wisdom of the field. The arguments will appeal to first principles to show that
the orthodox position is mistaken and requires revision. However, this should
not be described as a mere de lege ferenda proposal, sounding in policy or
normative arguments or moral philosophy. Rather, it is a proposal sounding in
the structure of the law itself, a structure that already exists and only needs to
be rendered explicit.
I. THE COMBATANT'S PRIVILEGE IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
The following Part argues that the current literature often uncritically as-
sumes that the privilege of combatancy does not apply to non-international
armed conflicts. The standard view is that the very legal concept of "combat-
ant" is a creature of international armed conflicts and the international laws of
20war that regulate them. Under this view, non-international armed conflicts
have no combatants at all--only government troops and rebels.21 Government
forces are authorized to commit killings by their own domestic law, while re-
22bels are not. Consequently, government troops will not be prosecuted at the
conclusion of a civil war while vanquished rebels could be prosecuted for their
belligerent acts against the government.23
It is important to remember that the privilege of combatancy is both a
prohibition and a license that can be inferred from the prohibition. First, the
privilege is a prohibition against nation-states that might be tempted to prose-
cute enemy soldiers for killing in wartime. The privilege of combatancy oper-
ates as a rule of international law forbidding states from engaging in such pros-
ecutions.24 A state may only prosecute enemy soldiers for violating the laws of
war by, say, deliberately killing civilians or engaging in other illegal acts of
perfidy. But a state would be violating international law if it were to go ahead
and prosecute the enemy for garden-variety acts of combat during the war. In-
20. See Newton, supra note 7, at 342-43.
21. See GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL
APPROACH 134 (2012) ("Historically, only the representatives of sovereign governments were privi-
leged belligerents, as they were asked to represent their government and charged with the responsibility
of using lawful force on behalf of their nation to subdue the enemy; unprivileged belligerents do not
represent lawful (competent) state authority.").
22. See Melzer, supra note 11, at 318 (noting that "domestic legislation in most countries pro-
vides members of state armed forces with protection from prosecution for lawful acts of state (ie a status
equivalent to combatant privilege)"). Solis argues that during the Spanish Civil War there was a "special
agreement" that both sides of the conflict would grant prisoners a "status equivalent to POW," though it
was not technically POW status. See SOLIS, supra note 5, at 191.
23. A full analysis of this issue is provided infra Section III.A.
24. For a discussion of the privilege, see Waldemar Soilf, The Status of Combatants in Non-
International Armed Conflicts Under Domestic Law and Transnational Practice, 33 AM. UNIV. L. REV.
53, 57-58 (1983).
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stead, the current scheme assumes that such soldiers ought o be granted POW
status and returned at the conclusion of hostilities.25 From this general scheme,
one can infer a license that runs to each individual soldier.26 Each soldier en-
joys the privilege of combatancy and can engage in wartime killing against le-
gitimate targets without fear of criminal prosecution. The privilege applies be-
cause the killing of an enemy soldier during war is no crime at all.27
Most scholars assume that this scheme does not apply in civil wars.28 A
state may prosecute its enemies after a civil war, precisely because those ene-
mies are subjects who rose up to defy the government. There is a certain logic
in this rule, because if a subject were to commit a single killing of a govern-
ment official during peacetime, that would be considered murder and subject o
criminal prosecution. It would seem odd to suggest that a group of bandits and
outlaws could bootstrap themselves into immunity from prosecution simply by
killing more victims-an absurd result. More importantly, the standard view is
that the drafters of the Geneva Conventions in 1949 refused to apply the new
legal regulations of the Geneva Conventions to civil wars precisely because
they wanted to retain the authority to prosecute, as outlaws and bandits, internal
enemies that rose up against the state.29 The one exception was Common Arti-
cle 3, which provided limited protections to enemy soldiers during civil wars,
including the right to humane treatment, which meant that captured enemies
could not be summarily executed or tortured. But the gist of the Geneva negoti-
ations in 1949 was that states wanted to shield most of their conduct in internal
civil wars from international legal regulation; they wanted to retain the right to
prosecute rebels as criminals.30 That explains the standard view that the privi-
lege of combatancy does not apply in non-international armed conflicts.
31
Although it is true that there exists no codified privilege of combatancy in
25. Geneva Convention Relevant to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 82-89, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
26. See CRAWFORD, supra note 10, at 53 n. 11; Derek Jinks, Protective Parity and the Laws of
War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 1502 (2004).
27. See Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General
Order No. 100, art. 57 (Apr. 24, 1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code] ("So soon as a man is armed by a sov-
ereign government and takes the soldier's oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or
other warlike acts are not individual crimes or offenses. No belligerent has a right to declare that ene-
mies of a certain class, color, or condition, when properly organized as soldiers, will not be treated by
him as public enemies."). For a discussion of the privilege, see YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 33 (2d ed. 2010); Sean Watts, Pre-
sent and Future Conceptions of the Status of Government Forces in Non-International Armed Conflict,
88 INT'L L. STUD. 145, 151-52 (2012) (noting disagreement over whether the combatant's privilege is an
immunity from prosecution or an affirmative license).
28. See, e.g., Nils Melzer, Bolstering the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, in
REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 508, 516 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2012) (con-
cluding that international law is unlikely to extend the privilege to non-international conflicts).
29. See, e.g., Louise Doswald-Beck, Private Military Companies Under International Human-
itarian Law, in FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY
COMPANIES 115, 116-17 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007) (concluding that the drafters
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions refused to confer POW status on rebels).
30. See Watts, supra note 27, at 153 (noting state reluctance to extend combatant privilege to
civil wars and concluding that "general reluctance to yield sovereignty over internal affairs and lack of
consensus have all contributed to the NIAC legal void").
31. See ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 58 (2010).
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non-international armed conflicts, the situation is far more nuanced and com-
plex than the current literature assumes.32 The privilege of combatancy may not
apply in most non-international armed conflicts, but there are situations where
functional arguments have greater purchase than commonly understood. First,
the armed conflict against al-Qaeda is not a civil war in the traditional sense,
though it is an armed conflict "not of an international character" since it only
involves one formal state.33 Given that the drafters of the Geneva Conventions
did not explicitly contemplate an armed conflict of this type, it is unclear
whether the conflict should be governed by the legal rules associated with in-
ternational conflicts or the rules for civil wars. The argument in favor of apply-
ing the rules from international armed conflicts i  simple: the conflict with al-
Qaeda is transnational and crosses international boundaries, thus implicating
many of the operational and regulatory concerns of IHL.34 The argument for
applying the rules of NIAC is that the armed conflict is between a state and
non-state actor, just like a civil war. Applying these arguments to the combat-
ant's privilege, there might be reason to think that the privilege applies to
transnational armed conflicts like the one against al-Qaeda, since it is unclear
whether the armed conflict is properly classified as an IAC, NIAC, or some-
where in between.
35
Second, the situation is equally complex when rebels control a significant
amount of territory and start fulfilling the regulatory powers that one normally
associates with governmental action. In that situation, the rebel forces become a
de facto state-like entity that may even be recognized as a newly formed state
by some third-party observers. Insofar as the rebels are in control of territory
and population, they may even exhibit de facto sovereignty.36 In these situa-
tions it becomes excessively formalistic to deny the combatant's privilege to
32. There are some notable exceptions. See, e.g., SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 13, at 515-20;
Ian Henderson, Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the Use of Armed Drones, 13 Y.B. INT'L
HUMANITARIAN L. 133, 147 (2010) (concluding that government forces but not insurgents enjoy the
combatant's privilege in NIACs).
33. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the armed conflict was not of an international
character and therefore Common Article 3 applied to government conduct. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006) (noting the policy argument that he scope of Common Article 3 should be as
wide as possible); see also Fionnuala D. Ni Aolhin, Hamdan and Common Article 3: Did the Supreme
Court Get it Right?, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1523, 1524 (2007) (decrying the "clumsiness of application and a
dearth of analytical rigor" in the Supreme Court's analysis of Common Article 3); Lubell, supra note 6,
at 429 (noting the government's acceptance of the Supreme Court's classification).
34. But see Marko Milanovic & Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, A Taxonomy of Armed Conflict, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 256, 307 (Nigel D. White &
Christian Henderson eds., 2013) (discussing the shift in the U.S.'s understanding of the conflict from
IAC to NIAC).
35. The lack of certainty in applying the classification system is well known. See Ni Aolhin,
supra note 33, at 1553-55; Tom Farer, Humanitarian Law & Armed Conflicts: Toward the Definition of
"International Armed Conflict," 71 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 43 (1971) ("One of the most assured things that
might be said about the words 'armed conflict not of an international character' is that no one can say
with assurance precisely what meaning they were intended to convey.").
36. For a discussion of de facto sovereignty, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 754
(2008) (holding that the writ of habeas corpus runs to Guantanamo Bay because the United States enjoys
de facto sovereignty over the military base in Cuba). See also Anthony J. Colangelo, 'De facto Sover-
eignty ": Boumediene and Beyond, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 623, 625 (2009) (noting that the Supreme
Court specifically rejected de jure sovereignty in favor of de facto sovereignty as the relevant standard
for the writ).
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these soldiers.37 Indeed, under the orthodox view, the existence or non-
existence of the privilege would depend entirely on the prior question of
whether the rebel territory constitutes a new state. If it is recognized as a new
state, the soldiers are privileged; if the rebel territory is not a state, the soldiers
are liable. This analysis is highly formalistic and ties the fate of individual sol-
diers to a macro-determination of public international law that remains utterly
obscure to them. This suggests that the privilege of combatancy may have a
role to play in some marginal NIAC situations where the basic prerequisites of
the conflict look more like an IAC than a NIAC.
The following argument proceeds in three steps. First, Section L.A con-
siders the functional requirements for lawful belligerency and notes that state
authority is not logically required for them. At a conceptual level, non-state ac-
tors are capable of meeting the functional requirements for collective belliger-
ency; recognizing the privilege associated with that belligerency would simply
acknowledge the fact that the non-state actor meets these functional require-
ments. Second, Section I.B asks whether regular armed forces of a state party to
a conflict are required to meet the functional standards of belligerency in order
to gain the privilege of combatancy. The standard answer is no, based in part on
the wording of the Hague Convention of 1909 and the Geneva Conventions of
1949. This Article disputes that common assumption because it produces inco-
herent results. The more plausible answer is that regular armed forces are also
required to meet the functional requirements of belligerency because those re-
quirements are constitutive of a definition of being a regular armed force in the
first place. Third, Section I.C canvasses the policy reasons-which are substan-
tial-for extending the privilege to some NIAC situations.
A. Functional Requirements for Belligerency
The most obvious argument in favor of a limited recognition of the priv-
ilege in at least some non-international armed conflicts is the nature of the
standards for the privilege, which are general and do not require the existence
of a state party to be fulfilled. Only a formalist reading of the requirements for
privileged belligerency supports the conclusion that combatants in civil wars
can never be legitimate belligerents. An analysis of the particular requirements
follows.
The requirements for privileged belligerency have remained remarkably
stable over time. The well-known requirements for prisoner of war status and,
by extension, the privilege of combatancy are outlined in Article 4 of the Gene-
37. A few scholars have produced arguments that, when taken to their logical extreme, imply
that failure to grant the privilege in NIAC risks collapsing jus in bello with jus ad bellum, because the
question of legitimacy of war aims is, properly speaking, the exclusive domain ofjus ad helium. The
neutrality ofjus in bello is only preserved by complete agnosticism regarding the legality of the use of
force, even by a non-state belligerent in a civil war. See, e.g., Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Over-
ride Jus in Bello? Reaffirming the Separation of the Two Bodies of Law, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 963
(2008); see also Franqois Bugnion, Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and Non-International Armed Conflicts,
6 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 167 (2003) (arguing that some rudimentary principles ofjus ad bellum
apply in non-intemational conflicts through the doctrine of the recognition of belligerency).
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 40: 337
va Conventions,38 though they were already listed in substantially the same
form in the Hague Regulations of 189939 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.40
The requirements include: (a) a command structure with soldiers "commanded
by a person responsible for his subordinates," (b) the wearing of a "fixed dis-
tinctive sign recognizable at a distance," (c) carrying arms openly, and (d) con-
ducting operations "in accordance with the laws and customs of war., 41 As
should be immediately clear, these requirements are independent of the exist-
ence of a formal state entity standing behind the military force: non-state actors
are capable of marshaling an organized armed force with a hierarchical com-
mand structure with soldiers who wear a fixed sign, carry their arms openly,
and conduct hostilities in accordance with the laws of war.42 These require-
ments are all independent of formal political legitimacy.
Negotiators at Geneva in 1947 were well aware of the broad sweep of
these functional criteria and there was a major push to allow militias and other
non-state actors the benefits of POW status and its implied privilege of combat-
ancy, especially in cases where the militia controlled territory of its own.43 This
proposal was not accepted and id not make its way into the final Convention
text.44 The delegates adopted a compromise solution that extended POW status
to militias and other resistance movements in occupied territories as long as
they were connected to a state party to the conflict.45 In other words, militias
involved in pure civil wars were not covered by Article 4's POW protections.
Militias were only covered if they were operating in occupied territory on be-
half of another state engaged in an international armed conflict with the occu-
pying power.46 All other militias and non-state actors are covered by Common
38. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. 4.
39. Convention with Respect o the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, Annex,
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 32 Stat. 1803, 1811 [hereinafter Hague
Convention of 1899].
40. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex,
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277, 2295-96.
41. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. 4.
42. The Lieber Code refers to organization by a "sovereign government" but not a sovereign
state. See Lieber Code, supra note 27, art. 57 ("So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government
and takes the soldier's oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are
not individual crimes or offenses. No belligerent has a right to declare that enemies of a certain class,
color, or condition, when properly organized as soldiers, will not be treated by him as public enemies.").
43. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION (III)
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 30 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter ICRC,
COMMENTARY TO THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION] (noting the desire of the Red Cross to extend all pro-
tections from IACs to internal conflicts).
44. The proposal included the following text: "In all cases of armed conflict which are not of
an international character, especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion, which
may occur in the territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties, the implementing of the prin-
ciples of the present Convention shall be obligatory on each of the adversaries. The application of the
Convention in these circumstances hall in no wise depend on the legal status of the Parties to the con-
flict and shall have no effect on that status." Id. at 31. The events surrounding the failure to accept this
proposal are analyzed in Richard R. Baxter, lus in Bello Intemo: The Present and Future Law, in LAW
AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 518, 519-20 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974) ("The broad
sweep of this stipulation proved to be too much for the majority of the states represented at the Diplo-
matic Conference."); Coin, supra note 12, at 263-64.
45. See ICRC, COMMENTARY TO THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 49-50.
46. Id. at 54.
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Article 3 and its more basic protections regarding humane treatment, which fall
short of full POW status under Article 4.47
The standard interpretation of this result is that a state could well prose-
cute rebels after winning a civil war.48 Common Article 3 would require the
state to provide humane treatment to the captured rebels (meaning they could
neither execute nor torture them), but they would not be required to recognize
them as immune from criminal prosecution for their acts of belligerency. The
standard argument for this interpretation is that the last clause of Common Ar-
ticle 3 states that the "application of the preceding provisions shall not affect
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict, ' 49 a clause that the Pictet commen-
tary refers to as "essential" because "[w]ithout it Article 3 would probably nev-
er have been adopted.,50 Specifically, Pictet refers to the fear that the extension
of Common Article 3 protection to armed conflicts "not of an international
character" could be read to include immunity from post-conflict criminal pros-
ecutions.51 However, negotiators were keen to avoid this interpretation:
It meets the fear that the application of the Convention, even to a very limited ex-
tent, in cases of civil war may interfere with the dejure Government's suppression
of the revolt by conferring belligerent status, and consequently increased authority
and power, upon the adverse Party. The provision was first suggested at the Confer-
ence of Government Experts in 1947 and was reintroduced in much the same words
in all the succeeding drafts Conventions. It makes it absolutely clear that the object
of the clause is a purely humanitarian one, that it is in no way concerned with the
internal affairs of States, and that it merely ensures respect for the few essential
rules of humanity which all civilized nations consider as valid everywhere and in all
circumstances.
Consequently, the fact of applying Article 3 does not in itself constitute any recog-
nition by the dejure Government that the adverse party has authority of any kind; it
does not limit in any way the Government's right to suppress a rebellion by all the
means-including arms-provided by its own laws; nor does it in any way affect
that Government's right to prosecute, try and sentence its adversaries, according to
its own laws.
52
This conclusion is an exaggeration. While it is clear that the delegates at
Geneva rejected far more sweeping protections for non-state militias fighting in
non-international armed conflicts, nothing in Common Article 3 explicitly re-
jects it. What Common Article 3 does include is a provision (paragraph 4) that
otherwise preserves the status quo, so that Common Article 3 cannot be read as
doing more than providing the protections that it explicitly codifies. But that
just leaves open the question of the exact nature of the status quo at the time, a
point that the existing commentaries often paper over. Whatever the existing
framework was for the privilege of combatancy at the time the Geneva Conven-
47. ld. at 57.
48. Id. at 40 ("As can be seen, Article 3 does not protect an insurgent who falls into the hands
of the opposing side from prosecution in accordance with the law, even if he has committed no crime
except that of carrying arms and fighting loyally."); Corn, supra note 12, at 268.
49. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. 3(4).
50. See ICRC, COMMENTARY TO THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 43.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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tions were adopted, the adoption of Common Article 3 did not change it. That
says nothing about the preexisting state of the law on the matter. As Part II will
explain, that law was (and is) far more nuanced than it appears at first glance.
B. Belligerency Requirements for Regular Armed Forces
The functional requirements for belligerency ought to apply symmetrical-
ly for all parties to an armed conflict, regardless of their status. But most com-
mentators disagree. Not only do these scholars deny that non-state actors can
qualify for the privilege, but they also exempt regular state armies from having
to fulfill the traditional requirements of belligerency in order to qualify for the
privilege. In other words, regular state armies are entitled to the privilege by
fiat, regardless of whether they meet the four functional requirements of bellig-
erency.53 This view is mistaken and destroys the symmetry and reciprocity up-
on which the modem law of war is built.
The four requirements for lawful belligerency are listed in the Geneva
Convention in connection with militias and "members of other volunteer
corps," but the same requirements are not repeated for "members of the armed
forces of a Party to the conflict."54 This has prompted most scholars to con-
clude that members of the armed forces are exempt from the four criteria and
that only militias are required to follow them in order to gain POW status and,
by extension, the right of lawful belligerency.55 This view generates absurd re-
sults because it entails that regular armed forces are wholly exempt from the
principled requirements of lawful belligerency.
56
Consider the following hypothetical situation. The State of Hypothetica
passes a statute creating a Department of Defense with a "regular" army. How-
ever, the army is not required to have a command structure, nor does it in fact
operate with one. The members of the army wear no uniforms or fixed emblem
identifying themselves as combatants. Furthermore, the soldiers of Hypotheti-
ca's "army" do not carry their arms openly, nor do they generally comply with
the laws and customs of warfare. As a matter of course they deliberately target
enemy civilians, commit acts of perfidy, and regularly declare that no quarter
will be given. It would be absurd to conclude that Hypothetica's army is enti-
tled to the combatant's privilege just because they are the de jure armed forces
of a state party to an armed conflict. Indeed, one cannot conclude that Hypo-
thetica is an "army" at all unless one has criteria for determining what counts as
53. See infra note 55.
54. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. 4(l)-(2).
55. See, e.g., Melzer, supra note 11, at 303 (stating, "although visibility and respect for IHL
are legal obligations which may be relevant for individual and collective entitlement to POW-status or
combatant privilege, they are not defining elements of armed forces within the meaning of IHL"); Jordan
Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325, 329
(2003).
56. For a discussion of this argument, see EA/412/71 Military Prosecutor v. Swarka [1974]
(Isr.), reprinted in 7 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 264 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1977). See also ICRC,
CUSTOMARY IHL RULES, supra note 8, at 385-86 (discussing Rule 106, which requires that
"[c]ombatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an
attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack" and "[i]f they fail to do so, they do not have
the right to prisoner-of-war status").
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an army. The fact that a state labels a fighting group as an army is hardly dis-
positive of the matter. In fact, the correct criteria for defining an army are the
functional criteria listed in Article 4(2) pertaining to militias. The whole point
of enumerating the criteria for militia is that they ought to meet the basic pa-
rameters that fit our common-sense definition of what counts as an army, even
if they are not defined as an army under domestic law.
The best reading of Article 4 is that the four requirements in Article 4(2)
are already implicit in the definition of what counts as regular armed forces,
and the inclusion of militias and volunteer corps was designed to include within
the rule military units that operate in the same manner as regular armed forc-
es.57 Dinstein's description of the framework is helpful: there is a presumption
that regular armed forces already meet the requirements for belligerency, but
that presumption is rebuttable if the force fails to meet one of the functional cri-
teria. Soldiers who fail to meet the criteria, even if they belong to the regular
armed forces, are ineligible for the privilege and can be prosecuted for their
acts of belligerency.59 The fact that most fighting forces meet the requirements
is uncontroversial. Indeed, an International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) study on customary law notes that military manuals require that their
forces wear uniforms and carry their arms openly. Furthermore, the fixed in-
signia requirement is designed as a functional analogue to the fact that mem-
bers of regular armed forces already wear uniforms and identifying insignia.
61
Additional Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention confirms this analysis, since
the requirements of distinction and of carrying arms openly applies explicitly to
all combatants, not just militias and volunteer forces.
62
The combatant's privilege applies to government forces operating in both
international and non-international conflicts, and they are not exempt from
meeting the functional requirements of belligerency. This is an important in-
57. See DINSTEIN, supra note 27, at 42 & n.23 1, for an analysis of Bin Haji Mohamed Ali v.
Public Prosecutor, [1969] 1 A.C. 430 (P.C.) 449-50 (appeal taken from Malay.) (U.K.) (concluding that
regular armed forces are required to meet the standards of belligerency); cf Memorandum from Jay S.
Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J.
Haynes I, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def. 31 (Jan. 22, 2002) (suggesting that Taliban forces might
not be eligible for POW status if they do not meet the functional requirements of Article 4). It should be
noted that the Bybee memorandum includes several controversial and discredited arguments regarding
the President's ability to ignore treaty-based and customary international law and the status of Afghani-
stan as a failed state. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 193, 199-
207 (2010).
58. See DINSTEIN, supra note 27, at 42-43.
59. See, e.g., Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (finding that "unlawful combatants are
likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by mil-
itary tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful"); cf BAXTER, supra note 10, at 44-45.
60. ICRC, CUSTOMARY IHL RULES, supra note 8, at 386.
61. But see Paust, supra note 55, at 334.
62. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 44, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinaf-
ter Additional Protocol 1] (requiring that a combatant carry arms openly "[d]uring such time as he is vis-
ible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack
in which he is to participate"). Article 44 also preserves "the generally accepted practice of States with
respect to the wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, uniformed armed units of a
Party to the conflict." Id. No correlate provisions exist in Additional Protocol II governing non-
international conflicts.
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sight because it means that U.S. and coalition military actions against al-Qaeda
and associated forces can be scrutinized to determine whether government
forces are operating consistently with the functional requirements and are there-
fore entitled to the associated privilege. As will become clear in Part V, there
may be reasons to doubt that the requirements are met in cases involving CIA
operatives or even covert actions involving uniformed military personnel.
6a
C. Policy Arguments in Favor of a NIA C Privilege
It should come as no surprise that some legal actors are in favor of apply-
ing the privilege in non-international conflicts, since there are multiple policy
arguments to support an extension. First, extending the privilege to non-state
actors will give them an incentive to comply with the laws and customs of
war. 6 4 If rebels are always unprivileged, then they will be subject to criminal
prosecution after the war, up to and including capital punishment. What incen-
tive do rebels have to comply with the laws of war if they know they will al-
ready be subject to criminal punishment-including execution-if they are de-
feated on the battlefield?65 Indeed, the privilege's absence from the civil war
context gives the rebel extra incentive to fight desperately, up to and including
violating customary norms of decency, in order to win the war and topple the
government. Rebels know that victory is the only way to avoid criminal pun-
ishment and execution. On the other hand, the application of the privilege in a
civil war gives rebels reason to comply with the laws of war in exchange for
the privileges of professional belligerency and immunity from criminal prose-
cution.
66
Indeed, civil wars often produce non-state actors that meet all of the at-
tributes of sovereignty save actual de jure legitimacy. If a non-state actor is en-
gaged in belligerency, controls territory, and engages in the functions typically
associated with government, then the functional criteria for privileged belliger-
ency ought to apply with equal force to the belligerent in a civil war. In a sense,
the rebels become a proto-state entity and ought o be treated like one for pur-
poses of the privilege.
Also, denying the privilege of belligerency in non-international armed
conflicts is in stark tension with the recent jurisprudence from international tri-
bunals regarding the distinction between international and non-international
63. See infra Part V.
64. See Corn, supra note 12, at 280.
65. See id. at 287 ("Because non-state belligerents are excluded from even the opportunity to
qualify for such immunity (because they are not engaged in international armed conflict), they have ab-
solutely no incentive to modify their conduct or tactics."); Melzer, supra note 11, at 318 (referring to the
"destructive downward spiral" when insurgents become increasingly alienated from IL norms); Mous-
sa, supra note 37, at 988-89; Marco Sassoli, Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways To Improve Their
Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, I J. INT'L HUMAN LEG. STUD. 5, 26-27 (2010) (dis-
cussing incentives); Sandesh Sivakumaran, Re-envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed Con-
flict, 22 EURO. J. INT'L L. 219, 245 (2011) (discussing immunity as an incentive for IHL compliance).
66. See SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 13, at 518 ("Recognizing that some sort of combatant im-
munity provides an incentive for members of the armed group to comply with the law, but also appreci-
ating that states may or may not be willing to provide combatant immunity in the abstract and in ad-
vance of a conflict, alternative ways ahead need to be canvassed.").
2015] The Combatant's Privilege in Asymmetric and Covert Conflicts 351
armed conflicts.67 For purposes of defining and punishing violators of war
crimes, international courts have increasingly questioned the categorical dis-
tinction between international and non-international armed conflicts and have
suggested that the prohibitions applicable in the former are now applicable by
68custom in the latter as well. This has produced a growing assumption that the
classification of a conflict as international or non-international is less relevant
for the purposes of applying criminal sanctions for serious violations of the law
of war.69 While this does not directly entail the extension of the privilege of
belligerency to civil wars, it does throw into stark relief the growing incoher-
ence of treating international and non-international armed conflicts as categori-
cally different for purposes of the combatant's privilege. If the classification
scheme is largely irrelevant for purposes of understanding the nature and scope
of the prohibitions embodied in the law of war, then perhaps this should give us
pause before assuming that the distinction between IAC and NIAC is suddenly
crucial for understanding the privilege. Perhaps there is growing pressure here
as well.
Finally, one ought to reflect on the entire scheme represented by the or-
thodox interpretation of Common Article 3 and the POW standard expression
in Article 4. If the orthodox position is correct, the drafters of Geneva left the
world with a legal framework with two different types of armed conflict: inter-
national with privileged combatants fighting on both sides, and non-
international with government forces fifhting rebels .7 This interpretation is re-
peated like a mantra in the literature. Perhaps it represents the will of the
drafters at Geneva, but no one stops to ask whether it is logically coherent. The
framework assumes that one can talk of an armed conflict without importing
the language of belligerency.72 Since the drafters at Geneva wanted to import
international oversight and regulation of civil wars, they crafted a provision
(Common Article 3) that imposed substantial legal restraints during these con-
flicts, but they also wanted to exclude the moral equality of combatants from
that framework.73 At bottom there is a deep tension in this move: for purposes
of war crimes the drafters wanted to say that the conduct of hostilities during a
civil war is not a matter of domestic sovereignty but is instead a matter of in-
67. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 10, at 6, 154; John Cerone, Jurisdiction and Power: The
Intersection of Human Rights Law & the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict in an Extraterritorial
Context, 40 ISR. L. REV. 396, 396-412 (2007) (discussing convergence); Yoram Dinstein, Concluding
Remarks on Non-International Armed Conflicts, 88 INT'L L. STUD. 399, 406 (discussing the "trend of"
jus in bello governing international and non-intemational conflicts). But see Milanovic & Hadzi-
Vidanovic, supra note 34, at 272 (suggesting that despite the "successes of the IAC/NIAC unification
project in the past two decades, the distinction between the two persists, and will continue to be enor-
mously important in the foreseeable future").
68. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- I-A, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction 94-137 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
69. See ANTONIO CASSESE ET AL., CASSESE'S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 65-70 (3d ed.
2013).
70. See Baxter, supra note 44, at 519-20 (discussing the negotiation process at Geneva).
71. See, e.g., L. C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 304-05 (1993).
72. On the nature of the classification scheme, see generally Milanovic & Hadzi-Vidanovic,
supra note 34, at 256.
73. See Corn, supra note 12, at 268 (noting that extending the privilege along with Common
Article 3 was viewed by the delegates as simply unacceptable).
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ternational concern, relevant to the international community and subject to its
laws. On the other hand, the drafters (apparently) wanted to say that what the
government does with the rebels after the war is over-and whether it recog-
nizes them as morally equal-is a matter of domestic sovereignty and is not a
matter of international concern.74 The state can do what it wants in this regard.
Few bother to ask whether this framework is conceptually coherent. In fact, the
notion of professional belligerency is hard-wired into the concept of armed
conflict, since armed conflict is a contest between parties with professional bel-
ligerents operating on their behalf. The concept of belligerency is baked into
our understanding of armed conflict and the drafters attempt to separate the two
notions (belligerency and armed conflict) under the guise of regulating NIACs
is borderline incoherent from a conceptual point of view.
Consequently, there may be a role for the privilege of combatancy in a
wider number of armed conflicts than usually assumed. The criteria for com-
batancy are functional in nature and can be applied against both government
forces and rebels. There are substantial policy negatives if the privilege is de-
nied to rebels by fiat in all situations. Indeed, previous generations of interna-
tional lawyers were well aware of these implications and were comparatively
more comfortable viewing rebels in some non-international conflicts as legiti-
mate belligerents. A full analysis of this historical development now follows.
II. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
In contrast to today's international law, the nineteenth century and its his-
torical antecedents had a much richer classification scheme for understanding
and analyzing internal armed conflict. Somewhere along the way, much of this
classification system has been lost, at least among contemporary treatise writers
who slavishly hew to a rigid and narrow dichotomy between international and
non-international armed conflicts.75 The following Part aims to recapture that
lost complexity. Section II.A examines recognitions of belligerency, a process
by which states can voluntarily recognize a rebel force as an official belligerent
engaged in an armed conflict. This process recognizes the transition point for
rebel forces when they approach de facto statehood; as the rebels gain territory
and engage in the trappings of governance, they are often recognized as official
belligerents on that basis.76 Although this was traditionally conceived as a
recognition voluntarily conferred on rebels by their state, it should be remem-
bered that third-party states are capable of recognizing rebels as belligerents-a
process that occurred during the American Civil War-and at least some schol-
ars view recognition as a duty.77 Section II.B excavates the richer classification
74. Mdgret's analysis notices the tension as well. See generally Fred6ric Mdgret, Should Re-
bels Be Amnestied?, in JUSPOSTBELLUM MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 519 (Carsten Stahn
et al. eds., 2014) (noting that rebels in non-international armed conflicts are entitled to humanitarian
protections, but not to the privilege of belligerency).
75. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 10, at 154 (noting that "arguments in support of a uni-
form application of the laws of armed conflict have existed for almost as long as there has been a law of
armed conflict").
76. See SIvAKuMARAN, supra note 13, at 9-19.
77. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 85-93 (7th ed.
[Vol. 40: 337
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scheme for armed conflicts used by previous generations of international law-
yers. Finally, Section II.C applies this evidence to an interpretation of Common
Article 3(4), which preserved the existing law regarding the status of internal
armed conflicts. Since belligerents in NIACs were sometimes viewed as legiti-
mate, it is logical to conclude that Common Article 3 preserved-rather than
destroyed-that basic scheme.
A. Recognition of Belligerency
Any discussion of the recognition of belligerency should begin with the
U.S. Civil War. In his canonical codification of the laws of war, Lieber viewed
soldiers on both sides of the conflict as morally equal professional soldiers.78
The Lieber Code therefore supports the functional view of the privilege of bel-
ligerency: what matters is whether the troops are complying with the laws of
war, not whether they are fighting on behalf of a de jure sovereign. First,
Lieber's definition of armed conflicts is not limited to contests between states;
he defined war as a "protracted physical contest between large numbers."
79
Soldiers were professionals, who fought on behalf of the collective, which itself
bore the consequences of their action.80 Lieber's rejection of a fully state-
centric model should come as no surprise since he was codifying the laws of
war for use in a civil war; the first application of the Lieber Code was for a
non-international conflict. If the privilege of belligerency was inapplicable in
non-state armed conflicts, one would expect to find evidence in the Code that
Confederate soldiers were unprivileged combatants.
True, the Lieber Code provides in Section 10 that prosecutions for treason
are permitted at the end of the civil war.81 This issue will be analyzed in greater
depth in Part III, which will argue that the privilege of combatancy in civil war
prohibits prosecutions for murder under domestic law but allows for prosecu-
tions for loyalty-based offenses like treason for those who have defied the state.
However, two points are in order here. First, Section 10 allows for prosecutions
for treason for rebel leaders and commanders, though nothing is said regarding
rank-and-file troops. If indeed the privilege is absent, the prosecutions for all
members of the rebel forces ought to be permitted, yet Article 154 is limited by
82its terms to rebel commanders.2
Second, Article 154 should not overshadow Article 153, which offers a
more subtle analysis of the relationship between parties to an armed conflict:
Treating captured rebels as prisoners of war, exchanging them, concluding of car-
2008); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (1 st paperback ed. 2013).
78. JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN'S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 227
(2012). Witt suggests that Lieber may have been inclined to apply the laws of war to the South in part
because he had lived in the South, owned slaves at one point, and his late son had fought for the South.
Id.
79. Francis Lieber, Law and Usages of War, Lecture at Columbia Law School (1861) (on file
with Milton S. Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., Francis Lieber Papers,
Box 2, Folders 16-18).
80. Lieber Code, supra note 27, art. 20.
81. Id. art. 154.
82. Id.
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tels, capitulations, or other warlike agreements with them; addressing officers of a
rebel army by the rank they may have in the same; accepting flags of truce; or, on
the other hand, proclaiming Martial Law in their territory, or levying war-taxes or
forced loans, or doing any other act sanctioned or demanded by the law and usages
of public war between sovereign belligerents, neither proves nor establishes an ac-
knowledgment of the rebellious people, or of the government which they may have
erected, as a public or sovereign power. Nor does the adoption of the rules of war
toward rebels imply an engagement with them extending beyond the limits of these
rules. It is victory in the field that ends the strife and settles the future relations be-
tween the contending parties.
83
As this passage makes clear, the application of the laws of war during a civil
war does not entail a recognition that the rebels constitute a state or a legitimate
de jure sovereign. This is what is meant when paragraph 4 of Common Article
3 states that the provision does not change the legal status of the parties to the
conflict. Application of the laws of war does not transform a rebel force into
the army of a new sovereign power. But it is an exaggeration to jump from this
commonsensical assertion to the much broader claim, so often repeated today,
that the legal architecture of "combatancy" is irrelevant to non-international
armed conflicts.84 The truth is somewhere short of that.
The truth is that the dividing line between internal conflicts and interna-
tional armed conflicts is blurry and grey, hardly the black-and-white categorical
distinction that some assume it to be.8 In the past, the fault line between these
concepts was mediated by a particular legal doctrine, the recognition of bellig-
erency.86 Current analysis of the recognition of belligerency has fallen into dis-
repair.87 The doctrine existed to mediate the confused netherworld between the
two types of armed conflict. In general, the doctrine held that a state can recog-
nize an armed group as a belligerent party to an armed conflict. This recogni-
tion triggered some of the machinery of international law, in particular the re-
quirements of the law of neutrality. So, if a foreign state were to aid the rebels,
this would violate the third state's duty of neutrality and would render them co-
belligerents of the rebels.
The process of recognizing a rebel force as an official belligerent is of-
ten described as a voluntary process-a strategic decision made by a host gov-
ernment that confers official belligerent status on rebels, but only if the host
state decides to engage in the recognition.88 For the same reason, jus post bel-
83. Id. art. 153.
84. See, e.g., MELZER, supra note 5, at 323; SOLIS, supra note 5, at 191; Dormann, supra note
5, at 269-70.
85. Another example is the U.S. armed conflict against Native Americans in the nineteenth
century. The Indian chief Plenty Horses was acquitted of murder on the grounds that his killing of a U.S.
army soldier was excused by the privilege of combatancy during armed conflict. See SOLIS, supra note
5, at 30-34; WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 778 (Gov't Printing Office 2d ed.
1920) (1886).
86. But see Sasha Radin, The Current Relevance of the Recognition of Belligerency, in ARMED
CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: IN SEARCH OF THE HUMAN FACE 115 (M. Matthee et al. eds.,
2013).
87. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 384 (2004)
("The doctrine has declined to the point where recognition of belligerency is almost unknown today.");
Baxter, supra note 44, at 520 (noting that the institution had fallen into disuse).
88. See, e.g., WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (Oxford, Clarendon Press
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lum scholars often talk of the need and efficacy of offering amnesty to rebels
after a civil war, though again this decision is couched as an entirely voluntary
one.89 Though there are strong reasons for granting amnesty, the reasons are
often stated in moral, political, and philosophical terms-not strictly legal ar-
guments. But there are substantial reasons to view the recognition of belliger-
ency in non-voluntary terms.
90
Consequently, the doctrine of recognition is slightly more complicated
than usually assumed. True, a government engaged in an armed conflict has the
ability to recognize, or refuse to recognize, its enemy as a formal belligerent.
However, that recognition might be implicit or explicit. The U.S. Civil War is
illustrative of this point.91 Although Lincoln never formally declared the Con-
federacy a belligerent power, the Supreme Court held in the Prize Cases that he
had implicitly done so with various actions, including the naval blockades and
seizure of naval vessels.92 As such, the court took judicial notice that the Con-
federacy was a belligerent power and that the President could not now claim
that the laws of war were inapplicable to the resolution of the Prize Cases.
93
Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that the Confederacy was a belligerent
power.
Second, recognition of belligerency was not purely within the power of
the host state. Third party states also implicitly recognized the confederacy as a
formal belligerent by various actions of their ports with regard to Confederate
naval ships.94 Recognition of a rebel group as a formal belligerent was there-
fore not entirely within the control or discretion of the executive branch, nor
even within the control of the government itself.95 Third-party states figured
1880) (linking recognition of belligerency with state self-interest); Milanovic & Hadzi-Vidanovic, supra
note 34, at 263 ("The malleability and vagueness of the criteria suggested that the recognition of bellig-
erency was always more a matter of political expediency than a matter of law.").
89. See, e.g., M6gret, supra note 74, at 521; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Con-
flicts (Protocol II) art. 6(5), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II] ("At
the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to
persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related
to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.").
90. See, e.g., LAUTERPACHT, supra note 77, at 175 (concluding that the recognition of bellig-
erency, like the recognition of statehood, is a "duty imposed by the facts of the situation," because the
contesting parties "are legally entitled to be treated as if they are engaged in a war waged by two sover-
eign States"); STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 261 (2005)
(referring to the decision as a duty but noting that in practice the "logic was not strictly adhered to" and
the practice "was to allow foreign countries a fairly large measure of discretion in this delicate area").
91. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 204 & n.2 (H. Lauterpacht ed.,
7th ed. 1952) (stating that civil war between states in a federal system is an international war even in the
absence of a recognition of belligerency from third-party states).
92. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666-67, 669 (1863) ("When the party in rebellion occupy and hold
in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their
allegiance; have organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the world
acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest a war."). For analysis, see Baxter, supra note 44, at
518-19. See also LAUTERPACHT, supra note 77, at 193 n.1 (listing cases where the U.S. Supreme Court
applied international law to conflicts involving non-state actors).
93. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 670 (stating that a proclamation of blockade is "conclusive evi-
dence" of a state of war).
94. See NEFF, supra note 90, at 259-60; Radin, supra note 86, at 122.
95. See STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE AND GRAY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR
18-19 (2010) (noting British and French recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent power).
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into the calculus.96 That third-party states should figure into the process of rec-
ognizing belligerency is not as surprising as it sounds. Under general principles
of law, third-party states already yield enormous power through their determi-
nation of which entities constitute states.97 Regardless of whether one adopts
the constitutive or declaratory view of state recognition, it is undeniable that
recognition by a third-party is one part of the process by which states come into
being (in addition to meeting the objective requirements for statehood).98 Con-
sequently, third-party states may recognize a rebel group as the government of
a newly formed state (in the case of secessionist war), or they may recognize
the rebel group as the legitimate government of the parent state, provided that
they control enough territory and meet other relevant criteria.
99
Something very similar happened in Libya in 2013, when some countries
moved quickly to recognize rebels fighting against Colonel Gaddafi's govern-
ment as the new government of Libya. 00 Combined with the territorial control
exercised by the rebels, third-party state recognition helped solidify the rebels'
claims to de jure sovereignty.' It should therefore come as no surprise that a
lesser form of recognition-that of belligerency-should in part be controlled
by third-party states as well. 102 This again shows that the dividing line between
an international and non-international armed conflict is blurry and messy.'
03
B. The Nineteenth-Century Categories
The major nineteenth-century publicists generally viewed civil wars as
standing in a liminal space between mere insurrections and international armed
conflicts. Not all civil disturbances fell within this liminal category, and cer-
tainly localized rebellions were entirely a matter of sovereign concern. Howev-
er, civil disturbances and rebellions could ripen into a full-blown civil war that
triggered the application of at least part of the machinery of international law
governing conflicts.104 The strain of thought was the natural extension of prin-
96. Id. at 167-69; Radin, supra note 86, at 128.
97. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 77, at 26.
98. Id. at 67.
99. Id. at 87.
100. See Alan Cowell & Steven Erlanger, France Becomes First Country to Recognize Libyan
Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/europe/I 1 france.html.
101. The U.N. General Assembly eventually voted to recognize the National Transitional
Council as the legitimate representative of the country. See G.A. Res. 66/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/l
(Sept. 16, 2011).
102. See THOMAS ALFRED WALKER, THE SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 115-16 (London,
C.J. Clay & Sons, Cambridge Univ. Press 1893).
103. Note that Farer concluded that civil wars should not always be excluded from the defini-
tion of international armed conflict as that term is used in the Geneva Conventions. See Farer, supra
note 35, at 72 (describing the text of the Geneva Convention on this issue as "Delphic").
104. See, e.g., HENRY W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: OR RULES REGULATING THE
INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR 332-33 (San Francisco, H. H. Bancroft & Company
1861); see also NEFF, supra note 90, at 251 ("Before civil conflicts could be considered as true wars, a
crucial conceptual step was necessary: of somehow placing insurgents on a legal par with the govern-
ment that they were rebelling against, at least in matters relating to the conflict itself .... In this area,
perhaps more than in any other in the legal history of war, state practice took the leading role, with doc-
trine following demurely in its wake. The crucial step was the recognition that insurgent groups could,
and should, be treated as independent bodies on a de facto basis, provided that they met certain criteria
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ciples that can be traced back as far as Vattel in the eighteenth century. 05 The
publicists had different ways of putting the point, though the general ap-
proach-civil wars as standing in between rebellions and international con-
flicts-was the same.'
0 6
For example, Wheaton defined a public war as a "contest by force be-
tween independent sovereign States."'1 7 However, following Grotius, Wheaton
defined civil wars as a "mixed" war with elements of public conflict and pri-
vate conflict. 10 8 Civil wars were public because the government stood on one
side of the conflict; they were also private because the enemy fought against
the authority of the state rather than on behalf of it.'09 The "mixed" status of a
civil war meant that the armed conflict was not simply a matter of sovereign
concern and that some international law governed the conflict because "the
general usage of nations regards such a war as entitling both the contending
parties to all the rights of war as against each other, and even as respects neutral
nations."l 0 Lorimer concluded that when a soldier commits crimes in his pri-
vate capacity, states could withdraw their recognition of belligerency, which
would "depriv[e] the war of its public character" and would place combatants
"at the mercy of the municipal laws of the other" and "prisoners might then be
punished as rebels.""' But this was only possible when a soldier committed an
act "in his private capacity."' 12 Essentially, this explains why a soldier who vio-
such as the control of territory and the discharging of governmental functions.").
105. Vattel viewed conflicts on a scale of increasing intensity: commotion, sedition, insurrec-
tion, and finally rebellion or civil war. See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS §§ 289-90, at
421 (Joseph Chitty ed., Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson 1844) (1758). Vattel viewed the laws of war as
applicable to civil wars when a state is divided between two factions. Id. § 294, at 425 ("[I]t is very evi-
dent that the common laws of war-those maxims of humanity, moderation, and honour, which we have
already detailed in the course of this work,-ought to be observed by both parties in every civil war. For
the same reasons which render the observance of those maxims a matter of obligation between state and
state, it becomes equally and even more necessary in the unhappy circumstance of two incensed parties
lacerating their common country."). The distinction between rebellion and civil war was whether the
rebels had a just cause for resisting their own government. In the former they did not; in the latter they
did. See NEFF, supra note 90, at 254-55. This just cause distinction appears earlier in in the mid-
eighteenth century in Wolff. See 2 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA
PERTRACTATUM §1011, at 514 (Joseph H. Drake trans., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1934) (1749) ("[Slince
rebellion has an unjust cause, but civil war a just cause, a rebellion is not a civil war and civil war is not
rebellion; consequently subjects who stir up a civil war are not rebels.").
106. See, e.g., 3 F. DE MARTENS, TRAITt DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 185 (Alfred Ldo trans.,
Paris, Librarie A. Marescq Ain6 A. Chevalier-Marescq 1887) ("Cependant lorsqu'une insurrection se
transforme en une guerre entre deux parties bellig~rantes r~gulirement organis~es, quand elle est con-
duit des deux c6tds par de vfritables gouvemements, au moyen d'armdes qui respectent les lois et les
usages des guerres internationals, une pareille guerre civile prend le caract&e d'une guerre international
... " ["An insurrection is transformed into a war between belligerent parties regularly organized, when
it is conducted by both sides by veritable governments, by armies that respect the laws and usages of
international wars; such a civil war takes the character of an international war .... ]). For a discussion,
see NEFF, supra note 90, at 250.
107. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 364 (William Beach Lawrence
ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1855) (1836).
108. Id. at 365. For the Grotian view, see HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 91
(Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (1625).
109. WHEATON, supra note 107, at 365.
110. Id.
111. 2 JAMES LORIMER, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 76 (Edinburgh & London,
William Blackwood & Sons 1883).
112. Id.at75-76.
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lates the laws of war can be punished before a military tribunal and therefore
loses the privilege of belligerency.
Westlake held similar views, noting the fundamentally bifurcated nature
of civil wars.113 They were, on the one hand, war in the sense of international
law; but, on the other hand, also treason.114 For Westlake,
[t]he truth is that a great insurrection with a real government at its head may have
both characters. It will be war for the purpose of the neutrality of the powers which
recognise the insurgents as having belligerent rights, and even the government
against which it is directed may and ought, for the sake of humanity, to treat it as
war while the struggle continues, though if and when it has been put down the in-
ternal law of that government will not thereby be prevented from regarding it as115
treason.
This is fully in line with the standard view of the hybrid or mixed theory of the
U.S. Civil War-a police action and a war against a belligerent at the same
time. 116 But it was clear that a party in a full civil war held belligerent rights,
1 17
as long as the civil conflict took on the character of a public war.1 8 Neutral
countries were in a position to confer belligerent status when they viewed the
civil conflict as being the functional equivalent of an inter-state war. 1
19
Under this view, soldiers fighting in a rebellion that ripened into a full
civil war, recognized as such by the international community, were regarded as
legitimate belligerents.120 If the rebels lost the war, the winning government
was capable of prosecuting them for treason, though this did not diminish the
fact that when the war ripened from a mere insurrection to a full civil war, the
rebels in some sense graduated from mere thugs and criminals into professional
soldiers, entitled to all the respect that international law conferred on sol-
diers.121 All soldiers were deserving of humane treatment and the protection of
113. 2 JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1907).
114. Id. at 2.
115. Id.
116. See NEFF, supra note 95, at 15; WITT, supra note 78, at 151 ("By establishing a blockade
and declaring southern privateers to be pirates, Lincoln had insisted that the preservation of the Union
could be a war and a criminal law enforcement action at the same time, that there was no need to choose
either paradigm once and for all.").
117. See WESTLAKE, supra note 113, at 1 ("[W]ar is the state or condition of governments con-
tending by force. Governments are here mentioned and not states, because the laws of war belong equal-
ly to insurgents not yet recognised as a state but recognised as having belligerent rights, which they
could not be if they did not possess a government.") (emphasis omitted); see also Milanovic & Hadzi-
Vidanovic, supra note 34, at 263.
118. See, e.g., 2 JAN HELENUS FERGUSON, MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, FOR THE USE OF
NAvIES, COLONIES AND CONSULATES 258 (The Hague, Martinus Nyhoff 1884) ("[W]here the contest
assumes the character of a public war, as refined and recognized by the Law of Nations, it is the general
usage of other States to concede to both parties the rights of war, so far as regards the law of blockage,
of contraband, etc.").
119. Lorimer held similar views, regarding both the U.S. Civil War and the Latin American
wars of independence between 1816 and 1825 as being transformed in a limited sense into "international
wars" by virtue of the "recognition of belligerency by neutral Powers." See LORIMER, supra note 111, at
32.
120. Phillimore believed that civil or revolutionary actions could ripen into a full war and he
included a lengthy discussion of the application of international law to civil wars. See 3 ROBERT
PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 148, 152-53 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. John-
son & Co. 1857).
121. See NEFF, supra note 90, at 257-58 ("This meant that captured opponents were entitled to
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the law while in captivity, a forerunner of today's POW status.
122
C. Reading Common Article 3 in Context
What emerges from the nineteenth-century literature is a clear view that
civil wars could be more than just internal rebellions; if sufficiently war-like,
they triggered the application of international law and the protections implicit
in them.123 Rebels recognized as belligerents were entitled to the rights of bel-
ligerency understood under international law. Why would the international
community engage in the state practice that generated this rule? After all, it
seems odd that states would concede that civil wars were subject to internation-
al regulation-an apparent conflict with the self-interest of states. However, as
some scholars have noted, this approach came with an advantageous flipside.
124
If rebels were legitimate belligerents fighting in an armed conflict, they could
not be charged as mere criminals for their battlefield killings. However, by ex-
tension of the war paradigm, they could be detained on the basis of mere mem-
bership in the rebel army without requiring proof of any particular acts of bel-
ligerency. 
125
Furthermore, the same logic applied to membership-based targeting as
well: rebel soldiers could be killed on the basis of their membership alone in
the rebel army without any more specific evidence of their threatening nature.
This represents a substantial benefit in extending the international law of war
paradigm to these situations. In the modem context, there is substantial criti-
cism of the shift to the more liberal detention and targeting practices of the war
paradigm in order to vanquish an enemy of the state,' 6 but it is a legal and stra-
tegic move firmly rooted in historical practice.
It is against this backdrop that one needs to understand the negotiations
that led to the adoption of The Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva
Conventions of 1949. If Common Article 3 changed nothing, as scholars argue,
be treated as prisoners of war, so that they could only be subjected to a non-punitive detention, to pre-
vent them from rejoining and augmenting their forces. They could not be prosecuted as criminals (ex-
cept in the marginal case in which they were accused of having committed breaches of the international
rules on the conduct of war itself) .... It was generally conceded, however, that these constraints on the
government's conduct only applied during the struggle itself. After the disturbances had ended, the gov-
ernment could proceed to prosecute the rebels as criminals if it wished.").
122. As Lorimer put it in his Institutes of the Law of Nations, captured soldiers were no longer
citizens of any state-they became "citizens of the world." See LORIMER, supra note 111, at 72
("Though separated, for the time being, from any political community, they once more belong to human-
ity and to themselves.").
123. See, e.g., WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW pt. 1, ch. 1, §5 (Oxford, Claren-
don Press 1880) ("When a community in attempting to separate itself from the state to which it belongs,
sets up a government and carries on hostilities in a regular manner, it shows in the course of performing
these acts a more complete momentary independence than those communities ... of which independ-
ence is qualified .... Frequently however it is admitted, through what is called recognition as a belliger-
ent, to the privileges of law for the purposes of the hostilities in which it has engaged in order to estab-
lish its legal independence.").
124. See NEFF, supra note 90, at 257 (discussing membership-based etention).
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan, 2004-2009, in SHOOTING To KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT 263
(Simon Bronitt et al. eds., 2012).
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then we need to fall back on the existing law before Geneva, i.e., the nineteenth
century framework. International lawyers generally tend to ignore the nine-
teenth century when engaging in their historical understanding of the field. 127 If
indeed the extension of basic principles of humanitarian law to non-internal
armed conflicts in Common Article 3 "did not change the status of the par-
ties,"' 128 then one needs to understand the status quo prior to the first half of the
twentieth century: that rebels were capable of being combatants. Consequently,
the view that the concept of "combatant" is utterly foreign to non-internal con-
flicts is an exaggeration. 121
How then to understand the limit in Common Article 3 that the protec-
tions "do not change the status of the parties"?130 The more sensible interpreta-
tion is that the provision codified the intuition that entitlement to humanitarian
protections (under Common Article 3) did not entail that rebel movements were
legitimate and entitled to recognition as formal state entities. The phrase also
implied, by corollary, that if government forces were successful in their
fighting, they could then prosecute the rebels for treason (since Common Arti-
cle 3 did not imply by logical deduction that their struggle against the govern-
ment was legitimate in some macro legal and political sense). Although the law
of war under Common Article 3 protects rebels, the nature of those protections
does not prohibit their post bellum prosecution for treason, since Common Ar-
ticle 3 had no effect on the legitimacy of their struggle. In a sense, Common
Article 3(4) has more to do with jus ad bellum internum (agnosticism with re-
spect to the legitimacy of the conflict) rather than thejus in bello interno. This
is entirely consistent with recognizing the privilege of combatancy in the non-
international context.
How does one square the claim that rebels could have a privilege of bel-
ligerency with the claim that a victorious government could prosecute them for
treason? Although this sounds like a contradiction, a careful analysis of the
domestic prohibition on killing, its relationship to the combatant's privilege,
and the historical evidence, shows that prosecution for treason is entirely con-
sistent with the privilege, once its appropriate contours are understood. Simply
put, murder and treason are different crimes that penalize conceptually distinc-
tive normative violations, as the following Part will explain.
III. POST-BELLUM PROSECUTIONS FOR WARTIME CONDUCT
The following Part develops the distinction between prosecution for loy-
alty-based offences and prosecution for murder. It concludes that even if the
privilege of combatancy were to attach to rebels in some non-international
armed conflicts, a state could still prosecute rebels and insurgents for violating
a duty of loyalty to their state. This demonstrates that a "non-international priv-
127. See David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History ofan Illusion,
65 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 385 (1996) (noting that public international lawyers recognize Vattel and Grotius
as precursors but generally ignore nineteenth century sources).
128. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. 3(4).
129. See SOLIS, supra note 5, at 191; Newton, supra note 7, at 343; Goodman, supra note 5.
130. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. 3(4).
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ilege of combatancy" is consistent with the underlying policy rationale for the
orthodox position, which seeks to preserve the right of states to prosecute van-
quished rebels. In other words, recognizing non-international privilege of com-
batancy does not require foregoing a criminal law response after the end of a
civil war-which is precisely the sticking point that is often cited for denying
the existence of a non-international privilege of combatancy. The distinction
between murder and treason is neither thin nor contrived; it is, rather, necessary
in order to properly conceptualize the relationship between a citizen and his or
her state. Section III.A explains the distinction between prosecuting rebels
for treason or murder and Part V applies this insight to current asymmetrical
conflicts.
A. Prosecution for Loyalty-Based Offenses
Although rebellions can ripen into full-blown civil wars that trigger the
machinery of international law, this is not to say that the privilege prevents the
victorious government from taking any and all action against the vanquished
rebels. Rebels are responsible for their decision to violate their duty of loyalty
to the government and as such can be prosecuted for treason and other loyalty-
based crimes. 132 However, soldiers in bona fide civil wars are combatants enti-
tled to the privilege of combatancy and should not be prosecuted for murder.
Although the privilege extinguishes the criminal liability associated with their
killing of enemy soldiers in wartime, it does not extinguish their violation
committed against the government. 133
The current literature on the privilege of combatancy in non-international
armed conflict misses this subtle distinction and falsely claims that the privi-
lege is completely inapplicable in all non-international armed conflicts. Al-
though the distinction between prosecutions for murder and prosecutions for
treason is a fine-grained distinction, it is conceptually justified and accords with
historical practice, even if our knowledge of that historical practice has been
glossed over by the repeated assertion i  modem textbooks that the privilege
never applies in non-international conflicts. i1
4
First, consider the conceptual arguments. Recognizing the distinction
between murder and treason recognizes the essential symmetry in the privi-
lege's application in international and non-international armed conflicts; pro-
fessional soldiers are professional soldiers regardless of the type of conflict.
131. For a general discussion of the crime of treason, see GEORGE FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN
ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 47-52 (1993); Stephen P. Garvey, Are Attempts Like
Treason?, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 173, 203 (2011) (describing the violation of the duty of loyalty to fel-
low citizens).
132. See Coin, supra note 12, at 266 (explaining that "participation in hostilities against lawful
government authority was and remains almost universally regarded as perhaps the most serious crime
against the state: treason").
133. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667 (1863) ("They claim to be in arms to
establish their liberty and independence, in order to become a sovereign State, while the sovereign party
treats them as insurgents and rebels who owe allegiance, and who should be punished with death for
their treason.") (emphasis added).
134. See WESTLAKE, supra note 113, at 2 (acknowledging that individuals fighting on behalf of
non-state actors can be treated as parties to a war).
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Lawful combatants in international conflicts may assert he privilege and con-
sequently cannot be prosecuted for murder for killing enemy combatants. An
enemy government cannot prosecute them for treason either, though that has
nothing to do with the application of the Convention-it has to do with the fact
that the soldier owes no duty of loyalty to the enemy government. In contrast to
the rebel who violates an oath of loyalty to his own government, the interna-
tional soldier defies no relationship with the enemy government when he takes
up arms against an international enemy. So the privilege works the same way in
both contexts; what changes is the existence or non-existence of the duty of
loyalty. Finally, consider how the privilege works in the context of an interna-
tional conflict when one soldier crosses ides to fight for the enemy. Consider
an American citizen who leaves the United States to fight for Russia during a
hypothetical World War III. If U.S. forces capture the American citizen during
battle (while fighting for the Russian Army as a uniformed solider), the privi-
lege of combatancy would prevent the United States from prosecuting him for
murder but would not prevent the United States from charging him with treason
for violating his duty of loyalty to his own government. 1
35
Second, historical practice supports the distinction between murder and
treason prosecutions.'3 6 Generally speaking, there are few historical examples
where victorious governments have engaged in universal criminal prosecutions
of all rebel soldiers for domestic murder-an outcome one would expect more
frequently if the orthodox view of the privilege were correct.137 Instead, the
more typical practice is for rebel soldiers to be granted amnesty for their behav-
ior during the rebellion.' In some cases rebel eaders are charged with trea-
son, though in other cases a victorious government will decide for reasons of
expediency to issue an amnesty for rebel leaders as well,139 perhaps as a carrot
to convince them to lay down their arms. 140 The current literature generally as-
sumes that granting such amnesties is a discretionary choice, on the part of the
controlling government, to be made on the basis of the exigencies of the jus
post bellum situation. 14 However, the more nuanced answer is that in a bona
135. As it happens, the U.S. government did not generally prosecute American citizens of Ger-
man ancestry who fought in the German Army in World War II. In cases where the United States did
prosecute American nationals, they were members of the U.S. armed forces who deserted from their
military service. See, e.g., Court Weighs Pleas for Treason Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1952, at 24 (de-
scribing conviction of Martin James Monti for treason for taking an American military plane during the
invasion of Italy and flying it into German territory).
136. The Lieber Code is explicit in reserving the right of successful governments to prosecute
former rebels for treason. See Lieber Code, supra note 27, art. 154.
137. See VATTEL, supra note 105, § 290, at 423 (noting that in cases where the number of re-
volters is high, "clemency becomes a duty in the sovereign. Shall he depopulate a city, or desolate a
province, in order to punish her rebellion? Any punishment, however just in itself, which embraces too
great a number of persons, becomes an act of downright cruelty").
138. See Mrgret, supra note 74, at 524 (noting that amnesties are often linked to the "humani-
tarian project" even if the exact link is somewhat obscure).
139. This was the case during the U.S. Civil War. See NEFF, supra note 95, at 222 ("There had
never been much doubt that ordinary Confederate soldiers and civilians would not, in practice, be sub-
ject to prosecution."); WITT, supra note 78, at 268.
140. See Mdgret, supra note 74, at 525 (explaining the practice of providing amnesty in ex-
change for surrendering arms).
141. Antonio Cassese, Should Rebels Be Treated as Criminals? Some Modest Proposals for
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fide civil war, the privilege prevents the government from prosecuting rebels
for murder but it may prosecute them for their illegitimate and illegal decision
to take up arms against the government. 142
For some observers, the decision to fight against a government (treason)
and killings committed in furtherance of that fight (murder) cannot be so easily
separated. They all flow from the same source, after all, the internal armed con-
flict against the government; they are all war. In reality, though, the distinction
between them is structurally sound and mirrors the relationship betweenjus ad
bellum and jus in bello in international conflicts. International lawyers are al-
ready comfortable separating out these two legal frameworks; indeed they often
demand that they be kept separate. The jus ad bellum framework applies to the
decision to go to war and asks whether it was just and complies with basic
principles of international law and the general prohibition against the use of
force in the absence of self-defense or Security Council authorization. In con-
trast, the jus in bello framework focuses on how the armed conflict is carried
out. Even though both involve the armed conflict, it is possible to separate out
the why from the how. The distinction between treason and murder tracks the
same fault line. In prosecuting a rebel for treason, a court is convicting him for
the illegitimate and unjust decision to fight against his own government, a kind
of internal jus ad bellum.143 The actual killings performed in battle become
analogous to an internaljus in bello, a separate legal question that can be quar-
antined from the prior question of whether the decision to exercise force is law-
ful or not.
144
The fact of the matter is that there are few examples of civil war prose-
cutions of all soldiers on the losing side for the domestic crime of murder. 14
5
Such a practice would be predicated on the view that a civil war is made up of
thousands---or even millions--of cases of individual murder, a description at
stark odds with our common conception of war as being both quantitatively and
Rendering Internal Armed Conflicts Less Inhumane, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 519, 522 (Antonio Cassese d., 2012) (recognizing the need for amnesty and im-
munity but conceding no state practice for curtailing right of states to engage in post-conflict prosecu-
tions). Mdgret notes a tension with Cassese's "clear inclination toward recognizing a privilege of bellig-
erency in non-international armed conflicts." See Mgret, supra note 74, at 523 n.l17; see also Baxter,
supra note 44, at 526-27 (supporting the voluntary view because very state "must thus ask itself wheth-
er it desires to continue to apply its law for the maintenance of public order to all persons within the ter-
ritory of the state or whether it is willing to grant an immunity from prosecution and a protected position
under international law to those who fight against it").
142. But see Baxter, supra note 44, at 526 (concluding that a government can treat a rebel as a
"murderer" consistent with Common Article 3).
143. On the notion of an internaljus ad bellum, see Bugnion, supra note 37, at 168; Fr~drric
Mdgret, Civil Disobedience and International Law: Sketch for a Theoretical Argument, 46 CAN. Y.B.
INT'L L. 143 (2010); Frdrric Mrgret, Le Droit International Peut-il Etre un Droit de Rdsistance? Dix
Conditions pour un Renouveau de 1'Ambition Normative International, 39 ETUDES INTERNATIONALES
39 (2008); and Mgret, supra note 74, at 538 (introducing a notion ofjus adrebellium).
144. See generally Kjell Anderson, The Universality of War: Jus ad Bellum and the Right to
Peace in Non-International Armed Conflicts, in THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PAST, PRESENT
AND FtUTURE 52, 52 (David Keane & Yvonne McDermott eds., 2012) (discussingjus ad bellum in non-
international contexts).
145. See generally MICHEL VEUTHEY, GUtRILLA ET DROIT HUMANITAIRE (1983) (describing
the growing attitude of legitimacy or acceptance conferred by the international community on some
guerrilla movements).
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qualitatively different from peacetime murder. It simply is extraordinary to, for
example, disaggregate the U.S. Civil War into 750,000 cases of individual
murder. 146 This misses the irreducibly collective reality of warfare. 1
47
One comeback to this objection is that only the rebels have engaged in
murder, while government soldiers have engaged in lawful killings. 148 This
much is true. It has also inspired some scholars to argue for an asymmetrical
privilege of combatancy in non-international conflicts.149 Under this view, gov-
ernment soldiers are protected by the privilege while rebel soldiers are not, thus
making only rebel soldiers liable for murder convictions.150 Although there is
nothing incoherent about this possibility, it depends on how one views state
practice regarding post-bellum convictions.'5 1 Of course, states would never
prosecute their own soldiers (for regular acts of belligerency) after prevailing in
a civil war, since the state is the winning party to the conflict. The more apt sit-
uation to test the thesis would be a government party that loses an armed con-
flict and is replaced by the rebels who form a new government.152 If third-party
states cite international law as prohibiting a new government from prosecuting
the soldiers of the original government for garden-variety acts of belligerency,
this would constitute supporting evidence of the asymmetrical view. The prob-
lem, of course, is that it would also be evidence of the symmetrical view ex-
pressed here, i.e., that both government forces and rebels are immune from
prosecutions for regular murder.
The example of the U.S. Civil War is pertinent here. Rank-and-file Con-
federate soldiers were not prosecuted for their mere participation in the war.153
146. See J. David Hacker, Recounting the Dead, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Sept. 20, 2011,
9:38 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/recounting-the-dead (revising the death toll
of the Civil War upwards on the basis of historical research).
147. On the collective reality of warfare, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR:
GLORY AND GUILT IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 43 (2002) (describing international criminal law as the
union of individualist and collectivist patterns of thought). See generally GERRY J. SIMPSON, LAW, WAR
AND CRIME: WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE REINVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) (arguing that
war crimes as a paradigm require collective action).
148. For a description of this view, see Henderson, supra note 32, at 150 (noting that govern-
ments have a positive right under international law to engage in a non-international armed conflict
against internal enemies). Henderson also notes that in cases where non-state actors have been recog-
nized as legitimate belligerents, the armed conflict in question has been recognized as international in
nature. Id.; see also M~gret, supra note 74, at 533.
149. See Ian Henderson & Bryan Cavanagh, Guest Post: Military Members Claiming Self-
Defence During Armed Conflict-Often Misguided and Unhelpful, OPINIO JURIS (July 8, 2014, 8:00
AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/07/08/guest-post-military-members-claiming-self-defence-armed
-conflict-often-misguided-unhelpful.
150. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 433 (2012) (concluding that
government forces in NIAC "are permitted to use lawful force" but also noting that it "has always been
difficult to find a single descriptor that can be applied both to those fighting for, and those fighting
against, the government in such conflicts").
151. State refusal to prosecute government forces could stem from the international privilege,
domestic authorization, or obvious prosecutorial discretion.
152. An example of this would be the opposition forces in Afghanistan, including the Northern
Alliance, which ousted the Taliban from power with American and coalition military assistance and
formed a new government. See Paul Salopek, Rebel Fighters Enter Kabul, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 2001,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/chi-0 111130325nov 13-story.html.
153. See also NEFF, supra note 90, at 255-56 (citing British statutes defining American rebels
as engaging in treason but conceding that criminal trials were impractical).
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At least part of the reason for their immunity was based on principles of reci-
procity and comity; with so many Union soldiers in captivity in the South, Lin-
coln was mindful that providing good treatment to Confederate soldiers was
important to ensure like protection for Union soldiers imprisoned in the South.
Of course, captured Union soldiers were often mistreated, as the case of Ander-
sonville prison makes clear.154 However, it is clear that no Confederate soldiers
were charged, and that even prosecutions against rebel eaders for launching the
war were abandoned as the demands of reconstruction took center stage.1
55
Indeed, when prosecutions were considered during the Civil War, it was
always for treason and never for murder simpliciter. 156 And these prosecutions
were limited to situations where a duty of loyalty was owed to the government.
As John Witt explains in his history of the laws of war during the Civil War,
citizens of border states were prosecuted for treason for joining the Confederate
army, an action that Union lawyers "did not treat as criminal at all when done
by residents of the states that voted to secede.'57 Simply put, regular soldiers
in the Confederacy were viewed as professional soldiers who were engaged in
the process of belligerency that came with their citizenship in the southern
states. While the leaders of the rebel movement could have been charged with
treason, there simply was no question of charging regular Confederate soldiers
for murder for each act of killing during battlefield engagements. To assume
that the government could have charged them as such is to confuse crime and
158
war.
The nineteenth-century publicists writing on the law of war generally
spoke of post-conflict prosecutions in the language of treason, not murder in
the general sense.159 For example, Ferguson noted that in insurrection that rip-
ens into a civil war belligerent rights were "superadded to those of sovereignty"
and at the conclusion of the conflict the winning government could subject the
rebels to prosecution as "traitors." 160 Hall noted that it would be impractical to
treat such huge numbers of rebels as mere criminals.'61 In cases where interna-
154. See WITT, supra note 78, at 298 (noting that 12,912 men died at Andersonville due to in-
humane conditions). The commander responsible for the prison, Captain Henry Wirz, was later prose-
cuted before a military commission. Id. at 299-301.
155. Id. at 268, 322.
156. Id. at 268-69.
157. Id.
158. The distinction between the two concepts is complex. See generally George P. Fletcher,
The Law of War and Its Pathologies, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 517 (2007) (describing the different
frameworks and licit forms of action invoked by labels of crime and war, and the danger of hybrid
forms).
159. Again, this outcome is consistent with the general eighteenth century and nineteenth centu-
ry view. For example, Vattel claimed that when a sovereign was victorious in a civil war, he was re-
quired to grant amnesty to the rebel soldiers but permitted to "except from the amnesty the authors of the
disturbances,-the heads of the party: he may bring them to a legal trial, and punish them, if they be
found guilty." VATTEL, supra note 105, § 294, at 426. That being said, Vattel thought that punishing the
rebel leaders was more appropriate in a rebellion than a full-blown civil war, thus suggesting that even
the opposition leaders should receive clemency at the end of a civil war. Id.
160. See FERGUSON, supra note 118, at 258.
161. See HALL, supra note 123, at 27-28 ("As soon, it is said, as a considerable population is
arrayed with the professed object of attaining political ends, it resembles a state too nearly for it to be
possible to treat individuals belonging to such population as criminals; it would be inhuman for the en-
emy to execute his prisoners; it would be still more inhuman for foreign states to capture and hang the
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tional law recognized the permissibility of prosecuting former rebels, it was
generally for treason, not murder.'62 Indeed, oaths of loyalty were incredibly
important for understanding the relationship between a belligerent and the state.
By the nineteenth century, it was already well established that declaring that no
quarter will be given was contrary to the law of nations. When a soldier was
captured in battle but the capturing state was unwilling or unable to house the
soldier, the only other option was to release the prisoner "on parole"-a prom-
ise by the soldier that he would not rejoin the battle at a later point in time. 163 If
the soldier broke this solemn oath and was subsequently recaptured during a
second battle, he could be prosecuted by enemy courts for violating his duty of
loyalty (his promise) to the capturing state.164 This shows how deeply en-
grained the principles of loyalty and oaths were in the deep structure of the law
of war. 165 The concepts of loyalty and oath mediated the relationship between
individual belligerents and the states they fought for.
All of this raises the deeper question of the basic structure of the privi-
lege of combatancy-a woefully under-theorized question i standard interna-
tional doctrine. It is generally understood that he privilege transforms what
would otherwise be an unlawful killing into a lawful act.166 But the exact inter-
play between the doctrine of international law and the domestic criminal law is
somewhat mysterious. As a matter of international law doctrine, the privilege is
regarded as a prohibition under international aw that prevents a state from en-
gaging in prosecutions. 16 But that is far different from saying that the criminal
law does not apply. How does a doctrine from international law transform the
criminal law? One possibility is that the doctrine includes a corresponding de-
fense that operates within criminal law.' 68 But if so, it is not codified in crimi-
crews of war-ships as pirates; humanity requires that the members of such a community shall be treated
as belligerents, and if so there must be a point at which they have a right to demand what confessedly
must be granted."). However, Hall treats this as a principle of humanity, not a principle of international
law, calling it a "concession of pure grace." Id. at 28.
162. Id.
163. See Hague Convention of 1899, supra note 39, art. 11; see also WESTLAKE, supra note
113, at 65 (discussing Hague Regulations on parole).
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., 1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON 312-13
(Philadelphia, Bronson & Chauncey at Lorenzo Press 1804) (concluding that a citizen is incapable of
dissolving the bounds of allegiance between himself and the sovereign and is therefore responsible for
betraying that duty of loyalty and obedience).
166. Lieber Code, supra note 27, art. 57.
167. See ROBERT K. GOLDMAN & BRIAN D. TITTEMORE, ASIL TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM,
UNPRIVILEGED COMBATANTS AND THE HOSTILITIES IN AFGHANISTAN: THEIR STATUS AND RIGHTS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 2 (2002) ("This privilege is in es-
sence a license to kill or wound enemy combatants, destroy other enemy ilitary objectives and cause
incidental civilian casualties. A lawful combatant possessing this privilege must be given prisoner of
war status upon capture and immunity from criminal prosecution under the domestic law of his captor
for his hostile acts that do not violate the laws and customs of war."); Melzer, supra note 11, at 306 (ex-
plaining that the absence of privilege exposes a combatant to the "full force of domestic criminal law").
168. The relationship between the privilege of combatancy and the criminal law defense is
raised, though not analyzed, in the Office of Legal Counsel memorandum on the killing of Anwar al-
Aulaqi (based on research reportedly performed by Professors David Barron and Martin Lederman). See
Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to the Attorney Gen. on Applica-
bility of Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh
Anwar al-Aulaqi 17 (July 16, 2010) (concluding that the federal murder statute implicitly incorporates
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nal law, unless one refers to the public authority justification, though it is un-
clear if the public authority justification incorporates the privilege or simply
mirrors the privilege.169 The other possibility is that the privilege is implicit in
the law of war, and that the law of war is not limited to international law but
rather is directly part of the common law, which explains why the privilege is a
function of domestic law as well.1 70 Although there is some historical support
for the idea that the law of war was regarded as part of the common law, it is
uncomfortable to speak of a common law of war that is somehow distinct from
international law. 171 A final possibility is to adopt a monist view of internation-
al law, thus making it comparatively easier to explain why a prohibition at the
international level can reach down and operate as a defense in municipal law.
To review, the law of war permits states to prosecute the enemy after an
armed conflict, though we need to be subtle about asking which types of prose-
cutions are permitted. In the course of any conflict, whether IAC or NIAC,
states can prosecute the enemy for deliberately killing civilians. In the course of
a NIAC, a state can prosecute rebels for battlefield killings of enemy combat-
ants, though the proper charge depends on whether the rebels are entitled to the
combatant's privilege or not. If they are entitled to the privilege, they can only
be prosecuted for a loyalty-based offence, like treason, and they are immune
from prosecution for murder. On the other hand, if they are not entitled to the
privilege because they fail to meet the functional standards for the privilege,
they can be prosecuted for murder and treason. If the NIAC involves a foreign
non-state actor that owes no duty of loyalty to the government, they can be
prosecuted for murder only if they fail to meet the standards for the privilege of
combatancy. This result can be expressed in the following table:
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR BATTLEFIELD KILLINGS
Domestic Foreign
Non-State Actors Non-State Actors
Compliance with law of armed Treason Immunity
conflict (and entitled to
the privilege of combatancy)
Non-compliance with law of Treason Murder
armed conflict (and not entitled to and murder
the privilege of combatancy)
all relevant justifications, including the public authority justification).
169. For a discussion of the public authority justification in criminal law, see MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.03(l)(d); PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, CRIMINAL LAW 319 (2d ed. 2012) (stat-
ing that an "actor receives a defense if his conduct 'is required or authorized by the law governing the
armed services or the lawful conducts of war ... ').
170. This view, if correct, would suggest that recent references to the "U.S. common law of
war" in the al-Bahlul habeas litigation are not misplaced. See al-Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding, under plain error review, that the U.S. common law of war supports the au-
thority of the government to prosecute al-Bahlul for conspiracy, but not material support for terrorism,
before a military commission).
171. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613 (2006).
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IV. THE PRIVILEGE OF COMBATANCY IN MODERN ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS
Having established in Part III that the privilege of combatancy might
apply in some non-international armed conflicts, this Article will now apply
this insight to modem asymmetric conflicts against non-state actors, specifical-
ly the conflict with al-Qaeda.72 This Part will explain why members of the
U.S. armed forces enjoy the privilege, whereas members of al-Qaeda do not.
This is because members of al-Qaeda do not fulfill the standard criteria for bel-
ligerency: carrying arms openly, wearing fixed emblems, and following the
laws and customs of war.'73 As such, they can be prosecuted for murder-
under domestic law-for their acts of belligerency,' 74 or for war crimes when
they violate specific prohibitions in the laws of war (such as targeting civilians
or engaging in acts of perfidy). In a similar armed conflict against an enemy
that met the criteria for lawful belligerency, neither prosecutions for murder nor
prosecutions for treason would be permitted unless the individuals involved
were citizens or residents of the United States. Non-citizen members of a non-
state actor have no duty of loyalty against the United States and could not be
prosecuted for taking up arms against them. Criminal sanctions against them
would be limited to their terrorist activities or other violations of the laws of
war (directed against civilians).175 A full analysis follows.
A. The Privilege Applies in the Armed Conflict Against al-Qaeda
Consider the U.S. armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as other modem
conflicts between a state and a foreign non-state actor. These conflicts depart
substantially from the type of full-blown civil wars discussed in Part I and II,
thus requiring a significant degree of logical extension of principles to a new
context. The nineteenth century paradigm applied the bulk of international legal
regulation to rebellions that ripen into full civil wars. 176 Contests between two
warring governments within a state were regarded as sufficiently analogous to
an armed conflict between two international states to trigger the same basic
172. For a general discussion of this issue, see generally Joseph P. "Dutch" Bialke, Al-Qaeda &
Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees, Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed
Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REv. 1 (2004) (summarizing the four conditions of belligerency that need to be sat-
isfied in order to trigger the combatant's privilege).
173. See supra Sections l.A-B.
174. Although unprivileged combatants are guilty of murder under domestic law, they are not
guilty of committing "war crimes" as an offense under the law of nations. The United States originally
charged Canadian Omar Khadr with committing "murder in violation of the law of war" for killing an
American soldier in Afghanistan. As several commentators have correctly noted, Khadr's unprivileged
killing of an American soldier is a case of domestic murder but not an international crime per se. For a
discussion of this issue, see Joseph C. Hansen, Murder and the Military Commissions: Prohibit-
ing the Executive's Unauthorized Expansion of Jurisdiction, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1871, 1872 (2009). See
also BAXTER, supra note 10, at 52-53 (concluding that a hostile action by unprivileged belligerents is
characterized as a violation of international law only "from a fundamental confusion between acts pun-
ishable under international law and acts with respect to which international law affords no protection").
However, it should also be noted that Baxter assumed that unprivileged "secret agents" like the sabo-
teurs in Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), were subject to prosecution before military courts (even
though their crimes were domestic in nature). See BAXTER, supra note 10, at 52.
175. See supra Parts IV-V.
176. See supra Section I.A.
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paradigm of legal regulation.177 Consequently, soldiers in these conflicts were
defined as bona fide combatants whose killings constituted lawful belligeren-
178
cy. Their actions would not be prosecuted as murder, though they could be
charged with treason for their unlawful and unjust decision to violate their oath
of loyalty to the government. 179 However, none of these conditions apply to the
armed conflict with al-Qaeda, which operates outside the territory of the gov-
ernment that it fights, and which owes no duty of loyalty to the government it
challenges. Like much of the current legal terrain regarding the war on terror,
the present question requires application of old law to new facts. The purpose
of Part II was not to find an old framework that fits the facts of modem asym-
metrical conflicts. Rather, the goal was to problematize the simplistic and over-
ly categorical statement that the privilege of combatancy has no role to play in
non-international armed conflict. Having demonstrated that this is an exaggera-
tion and that no such categorical exclusion exists, the slate is clean to permit
careful reasoning about the appropriate role for the privilege in modem asym-
metrical conflicts, such as the war against al-Qaeda. The present Section takes
up that challenge.
Applying the basic principles outlined above, it seems plausible to sug-
gest that the privilege could apply in a conflict between a state and a modem
non-state actor-a classic example of what nineteenth-century scholars would
have regarded as a "mixed war" between a public state enjoying sovereignty
and a private entity.18 ° The fact that the private entity operates more commonly
outside the territory of the public state makes little difference to the analysis.
The most important element is the functional inspiration for the nineteenth cen-
tury view that was in place when Common Article 3 preserved it-that some
non-international conflicts take on the character of an international conflict, and
ought to be treated as such, if they involve two independent entities involved in
a military contest.181 In this sense, the nineteenth century view was supported
by a rejection of formalism in favor of a deep commitment to functionalism: if
the contest functioned like a de facto international conflict (such as between the
Union and the Confederacy) then it could and perhaps should be treated as such
by the international community. 1
82
177. See SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 13, at 515-20.
178. See supra notes 104-126 and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion of loyalty-based offences in the law of war, see generally RICHARD
BAXTER, The Duty of Obedience to the Belligerent Occupant, in BAXTER, supra note 10, at 7, 16-23.
Residents under a belligerent occupation owe a duty of loyalty to the occupying power, although the
source of this obligation is contested. See id. at 8-16.
180. See WHEATON, supra note 107, at 365.
181. If the armed conflict is functionally equivalent to an international conflict, then third par-
ties should be under a duty to recognize this fact, and it is erroneous to think of the recognition as being
purely discretionary. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 77, at 175 (arguing that the duty is imposed by the
facts of the situation).
182. This was certainly Vattel's view. He concluded that "when a nation becomes divided into
two parties absolutely independent, and no longer acknowledging a common superior, the state is dis-
solved, and the war between the two parties stands on the same ground, in every respect, as a public war
between two different nations." VATTEL, supra note 105, § 295, at 427. In that case, both factions view
the other as "rebels" because "there exists in the state two separate bodies, who pretend to absolute in-
dependence, and between whom there is no judge.. . [and] decide their quarrel by arms, as two different
nations would do." Id. The obligation to observe the law of war in a civil war was therefore "absolute"
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The armed conflict with al-Qaeda bears many of the hallmarks of such a
conflict. It involves an international conflict between a sovereign state and a
non-state actor with distinctive military and political goals. Furthermore, the
international community views the two entities as locked in an international
struggle and must decide which side to support, thus triggering elementary
principles inherent in the law of neutrality, the very principles that governed the
recognition of belligerency in the nineteenth century.'83 While the Taliban sup-
ported al-Qaeda and refused to declare its neutrality, other states have support-
ed the United States and offered assistance in the conflict.'84 These factors sug-
gest that the privilege could apply to asymmetric armed conflicts with non-state
actors-at the very least for government forces fighting on behalf of the
state."5
B. Al-Qaeda Fighters Fail the Functional Standard
Whether the non-state actor's fighters are eligible for the privilege de-
pends on whether the non-state actor fulfills the functional requirements for
lawful belligerency: a command structure, a fixed emblem, open arms, and
general compliance with the laws and customs of war. Although al-Qaeda ar-
guably meets the first criterion, it does not meet the other three.186 Terrorist or-
ganizations typically make no effort to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population, nor do they limit their targeting to military objectives. 87 Conse-
quently, al-Qaeda personnel are not entitled to the privilege of combatancy, but
not because the conflict is non-international. Fighters for al-Qaeda are not eli-
gible for the privilege because their armed group does not meet the functional
criteria. Killings performed by unprivileged belligerents constitute domestic
murder in the jurisdiction where the crime occurs, thus triggering the local ma-
chinery of criminal justice.188 However, none of this changes whether govern-
ment forces on the other side of the conflict are eligible for the privilege.
One could well imagine a future conflict between a state and a non-state
actor that complies with the functional criteria for lawful belligerency. Perhaps
and "indispensably binding on both parties." Id. at 427.
183. Bradley and Goldsmith first suggested that the law of neutrality was applicable to the
armed conflict with al-Qaeda. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2047, 2112 (2005) (discussing the doctrine of co-
belligerency). But see Kevin Jon Heller, Goldsmith Responds About "Co-Belligerency, " OPINIO JURIS
(Oct. 18, 2010, 8:49 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/10/18/goldsmith-responds-about-co-belligerency
(criticizing the extension of rules from IAC, including the law of neutrality, to NIAC).
184. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 183, at 2112 (discussing the duty of neutrality with
regard to non-state actors).
185. See Henderson, supra note 32, at 150. For a discussion of combatant status in non-
international conflicts, see also Richard V. Meyer, The Privilege of Belligerency and Formal Declara-
tions of War, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW & MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 183, 213
(Claire Finkelstein et al. eds., 2012).
186. Ambos argues in a recent paper that al-Qaeda is not sufficiently organized or hierarchical
to be a party to an armed conflict. See Kai Ambos & Josef Alkatout, Has "Justice Been Done"? The
Legality of Bin Laden's Killing Under International Law, 45 ISR. L. Rev. 341, 347-50 (2012). But see
Jens David Ohlin, The Duty to Capture, 97 MINN. L. REv. 1268, 1283 (2013) (concluding that al-Qaeda
is organized with a command structure, though not necessarily a linear one).
187, Additional Protocol II, supra note 89, art. 1.
188. See BAXTER, supra note 10, at 53.
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the hypothetical group is less interested in adopting the tactics of international
terrorism and more interested in fighting in accordance with international
standards, namely by deploying uniformed personnel who carry their arms
openly and target only enemy combatants.89 In this hypothetical conflict, the
underlying principles of belligerency suggest that it would be possible to apply
the privilege of belligerency to both sides of that conflict: the government forc-
es and the extraterritorial non-state soldiers who oppose them. This argument
becomes more plausible the more organized the non-state actor is. To the extent
that the non-state actor has something approaching a government, then the rea-
sons for applying the principles of international warfare become stronger, just
as they did for rebels fighting in a civil war in the nineteenth century para-
digm.190 In this scenario, soldiers for the non-state actor should be charged nei-
ther with murder nor treason, since they owe no duty of loyalty to the govern-
ment they oppose. However, they can be summarily killed in battle according
to the laws of targeting, detained until the end of hostilities pursuant to interna-
tional humanitarian law or domestic implementing legislation, and perhaps
even detained prospectively consistent with international human rights law. 191
They may also be subject to punishment for violating any applicable oath of
loyalty to their host state if their participation in the armed conflict is incon-
sistent with the directives and interests of their own sovereign.
V. THE PRIVILEGE OF COMBATANCY IN COVERT ACTIONS
In the case of the United States, military actions in asymmetrical con-
flicts are increasingly likely to include covert and unacknowledged uses of
force.192 Covert action and clandestine operations are distinct concepts and
should not be confused. Clandestine operations are designed to be secret in the
sense that the operators take action to avoid detection. In contrast, covert ac-
tions are unacknowledged in the sense that the deploying government refuses to
admit that the actors are working on behalf of the state. Some operations are
both clandestine and covert at the same time because the deploying state hopes
the military action remains secret and will refuse to acknowledge the force after
it is discovered. This Article concerns covert actions authorized under Title 50
or otherwise unacknowledged operations.
The United States relies heavily on covert deployments for multiple rea-
sons.193 First, host governments may have given permission for the U.S. mili-
tary to operate on their territory, on the condition that the United States does
189. See NEFF, supra note 90, at 251 (noting that Islamic law in the Middle Ages distinguished
between ordinary criminals and bughat, persons who "fought for some kind of doctrine or higher cause
than mere personal enrichment").
190. See, e.g., MARTENS, supra note 106, at 185.
191. The issue of security detention authorized under IHRL is discussed in Ryan Goodman, The
Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 48 (2009).
192. Cf. Wall, supra note 15, at 140.
193. For a cogent analysis of the reasons (both legitimate and illegitimate) for prior U.S. reli-
ance on covert action, see W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION:
PRACTICES, CONTEXTS, AND POLICIES OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND
AMERICAN LAW (1992).
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not acknowledge that they are operating in that area.'94 This might be beneficial
for the host government if an overt use of military force would upset local con-
stituents, thus triggering political problems for the host government.195 Second,
the host state may demand that the attacking force operate covertly because the
permission to operate is based on an explicit deal that no one wants to
acknowledge.196 The nature of the deal might include military assistance to the
host state's own military campaign, which the host government may not feel
free to acknowledge.197 Third, an attacking force may wish to attack covertly if
they believe that their jus ad bellum arguments for violating state sovereignty
are weak and therefore do not wish to acknowledge the operation.'98 For all of
these reasons, military actions against extraterritorial terrorist organizations are
increasingly conducted using covert and unacknowledged military action. The
paradigm of military force in Pakistan and Yemen (covert force that is general-
ly known but officially unacknowledged) may become the paradigm for future
security operations. 1
99
Because these operations are covert, they often include a significant
CIA presence.20 In particular, the CIA has argued for institutional primacy in
drone operations-maintaining a significant fleet of its own remotely piloted
vehicles-in order to preserve the covert and unacknowledged nature of the use
of force.20' This generated a substantial buildup of CIA paramilitary forces.2 °2
Critics have complained that the ever-growing paramilitary capabilities of the
CIA have distracted it from its primary mission of intelligence gathering and
203analysis. More importantly, others have argued that the CIA's involvement
in a large percentage of foreign military strikes has hindered transparency and
194. For a discussion of these issues, see Marty Lederman, Secrecy, Nonacknowledgement, and
Yemen, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 26, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/7454/secrecy-nonacknowledgement
-yemen (claiming that "a state will have reason not to officially acknowledge its involvement in a certain
action, even if the action is no longer secret in any real sense, i.e., where it has been widely reported and
where it is widely assumed (and perhaps even unofficially leaked) that the state in question was in-
volved"); see also Wilson v. CIA, 586 F.3d 171, 197-99 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing reasons for non-
acknowledgement).
195. This issue is discussed in Jack Goldsmith, Two Notes on Secrecy v. Transparency in the
National Security World, LAWFARE (Oct. 3, 2013, 12:24 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com
/2013/10/two-notes-on-secrecy-v-transparency-in-the-national-security-world.
196. This may have been the case with regard to U.S. military force in Pakistan. See MARK
MAZZETTI, THE WAY OF THE KNIFE: THE CIA, A SECRET ARMY, AND A WAR AT THE ENDS OF THE
EARTH 196 (2013) (discussing the United States' "Faustian" bargain with Pakistan).
197. Id.
198. See Goldsmith, supra note 195 (arguing that administration officials might be inclined to
proceed with a military strike covertly if they believe the action may not be consistent with the U.N.
Charter).
199. Id.
200. See Greg Miller, CIA Remains Behind Most Drone Strikes, Despite Effort to Shift Cam-





203. See, e.g., Select Committee on Intelligence, Additional Prehearing Questions for Mr. John
0. Brennan upon His Nomination to Be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. SENATE (Feb.
7, 2013), http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/I30207/prehearing.pdf.
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204accountability for targeted killings. Many critics have suggested that full
control over U.S. drone operations should be transferred from the CIA to
JSOC.20 5 It appeared for a time that the Obama Administration largely agreed
with that assessment, although it remains unclear whether that assessment will
be transformed into bureaucratic reality.206 At the moment, the CIA continues
to play an important role in drone deployment in foreign theaters where force
remains unacknowledged.°7
Several scholars have argued that the United States should transfer con-
trol of drone operations from the CIA to JSOC because the latter are uniformed
members of the regular armed forces and therefore eligible for the privilege of
combatancy.20 CIA personnel, without the privilege of combatancy, would be
violating the domestic law of the country in which they operate. 209 Although a
local prosecution of a CIA agent in Yemen for violating Yemeni domestic
criminal law is rather unlikely, it could be possible if civil war produces a
21021change in the central government, which as of 2015 seems likely.21' Under
this argument, JSOC should retain as much control over drones as possible.
The net result is that the Obama administration has deployed force in
operations that can only be described as truly hybrid in nature.212 The raid to
204. Cf Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/59 (Feb. 28, 2014) (by
Ben Emmerson) (concluding that CIA involvement in drone strikes hinders transparency).
205. See, e.g., Micah Zenko, Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 31: Transferring CIA Drone
Strikes to the Pentagon, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 2013), http://i.cfr.org/content
/publications/attachments/PIMDronesZenko Final_4 16_13.pdf (arguing for enhanced accountability
if drone strikes are authorized pursuant o Title 10).
206. See Mark Mazzetti, Delays in Effort to Refocus C.IA.from Drone War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/world/delays-in-effort-to-refocus-cia-from-drone
-war.html (discussing the slow pace of the CIA's response to President Obama's stated goal of decreas-
ing CIA involvement in drone operations).
207. Some sources have suggested that congressional officials blocked the migration of authori-
ty from the CIA to JSOC. See Eric Schmitt, Congress Restricts Drones Program Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/17/us/politics/congress-restricts-drones-program-shift.html.
208. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame, Testimony Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. and Foreign Affairs (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.fas.org/irp
/congress/2010_hr/042810oconnell.pdf (concluding that only members of the U.S. armed forces are enti-
tled to the combatant's privilege); Solis, supra note 3; Andrew Burt & Alex Wagner, Blurred Lines: An
Argument for a More Robust Legal Framework Governing the CIA Drone Program, 38 YALE J. INT'L L.
ONLINE 8-12 (2012), http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-38-burt-wagner-blurred-lines.pdf.
209. Burt & Wagner, supra note 208, at 11; see also Jens David Ohlin, Is Jus in Bello in Cri-
sis?, 11 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 27, 42 (2013) (arguing that CIA members are not privileged because they
do not carry arms openly or display distinctive signs); Kevin Jon Heller, Let's Call Killing al-Awlaki
What It Is-Murder, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 8, 2010, 10:34 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/04/08/lets-call
-killing-al-awlaki-what-it-is-murder ("I doubt many CIA field operatives carry their arms openly and
distinguish themselves from the civilian population.").
210. See Kevin Jon Heller, Is the CIA in the Drone Kill Chain? (Answer: Likely), OPINIO JURIS
(Mar. 17, 2013, 6:41 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/03/17/is-the-cia-in-the-drone-kill-chain-answer
-likely (suggesting in the comments section that Yemen could prosecute CIA officers under domestic
law in the absence of the combatant's privilege).
211. See Shuaib Almosawa & Rod Nordland, U.S. Fears Chaos as Government of Yemen Falls,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/world/middlecast/yemen-houthi-crisis
-sana.html.
212. The issue is discussed in Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2
HARV. NAT'L SECURITY J. 283, 346-47 (2011) (discussing the relationship between JSOC and CIA op-
erations).
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kill Osama Bin Laden was only the most famous example: the President author-
ized a covert action, under Title 50, using members of the armed forces (Navy
SEALs) who conducted the assault.213 In that case, the Navy SEALs were for-
mally under the direction of CIA Director Leon Panetta, who reported to the
President, even though the Navy SEALs are usually deployed by the Depart-
ment of Defense under Title 10.214 This issue is crucial because drone strikes,
even if conducted by uniformed JSOC personnel, can be conducted through Ti-
tle 50 and remain covert.
215
The following Part argues that military personnel engaged in
unacknowledged deployments are not entitled to the privilege of combatancy,
despite the fact that they wear uniforms and fight for a military organization
that honors the laws and customs of warfare.216 The attempt to solve the "privi-
lege problem" by switching authority to JSOC does not work.217 The privilege
does not run to these uniformed troops because the lack of state acknowledg-
ment frustrates the state's ability to assert the privilege on their behalf. The fol-
lowing Section will explain this argument by interrogating fundamental re-
quirements of combatancy that are rarely scrutinized in the academic literature.
Consequently, Section V.A will examine how the open arms requirement is
generally analyzed in commentaries to the Geneva Conventions and will show
that the traditional commentaries have viewed the requirement far too literally
and have ignored conceptual understandings of the requirement.218 Section V.B
will argue that the privilege is collective, not individual, i.e., that the privilege
can only be asserted by a collective fighting group on behalf of an individual,
rather than by an individual directly. Section V.C will argue that this view is
necessitated by the fact that the principle of distinction requires that troops
identify themselves as belonging to a particular fighting organization, rather
than as a combatant simpliciter. Section V.D will analyze under what condi-
tions a state's retroactive acknowledgment of the force might cure these de-
fects. Finally, Section V.E will specifically consider how to analyze the open
arms requirement when the weapon system in question involves the mixed de-
ployment of CIA and military personnel in drone operations.
The structure of the argument involves three elements that are all mutu-
ally supporting. Combined together, the open arms requirement, the collective
nature of the combatant's privilege, and the principle of distinction (and its as-
sociated prohibition on perfidy) all highlight the extreme pressure that the use
of unacknowledged force places on the basic structure of the law of war. Spe-
213. See Wall, supra note 15, at 85.
214. See Chesney, supra note 15, at 539-41.
215. See also Lederman, supra note 194 ("[A]s far as the law is concerned, both the CIA and
U.S. Department of Defense can engage in activities that are not officially acknowledged ... ").
216. For a general discussion of the use of uniformed forces in U.S. covert action, see Jennifer
D. Kibbe, Covert Action, Pentagon Style, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE 569, 583 (Loch K. Johnson ed., 2010) (discussing danger to the United States' reputation
when the government deploys regular armed forces, as opposed to the CIA, in covert operations).
217. Some of these issues are analyzed in Todd C. Huntley & Andrew D. Levitz, Controlling
the Use of Power in the Shadows: Challenges in the Application of Jus in Bello to Clandestine and Un-
conventional Warfare Activities, 5 HARv. NAT'L SECURITY J. 461, 490 (2014).
218. See, e.g., ICRC, COMMENTARY TO THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 61.
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cifically, the law of war requires a transparent link between the combatant and
the state on whose behalf the combatant fights. That link transforms what
would otherwise be a simple act of murder into a lawful act of belligerency. In
the words of the Lieber Code, a nation will "advance and retrograde" with its
soldiers on the battlefield,219 and the results produced in the battlefield are ac-
cepted as binding on the nation.220 Without that link, a combatant is just an in-
dividual engaged in garden-variety murder under domestic law-an unprivi-
leged belligerent. As this Part demonstrates, unacknowledged force is
inconsistent with the deeper principles that provide the conceptual foundation
for the combatant's privilege.
A. The Carrying-Arms-Openly Requirement at Geneva
The requirement that military forces must carry arms openly to be eligible
for prisoner of war status is codified in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention.
221
Although there is no direct statement that this is also one of the requirements
for privileged belligerency, it is inferred based on the function of POW status
(which is inconsistent with a criminal prosecution while in detention). At
Geneva there appears to have been little discussion of the exact nature of the
223requirement. Perhaps delegates considered it obvious. Or, perhaps, the re-
quirement's codified origin from the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations meant
that the delegates were simply carrying forward an element of existing law and
224therefore it did not require extensive analysis or discussion.
The commentaries to the Geneva Convention all interpret the require-
ment in a physical sense and the debates are limited to questions regarding
weapons that are generally not worn outside of the body.225 A rifle is usually
carried slung around the shoulder, but a grenade might be transported in a
226backpack. Commentators fret over whether this hypothetical soldier meets
the requirement-a set of banal concerns based on the various ways that sol-
diers walk and pack their equipment between military engagements.
The ICRC commentary by Jean Pictet draws a distinction between car-
rying arms "openly" versus carrying them "visibly" or "ostensibly.,227 Arms
can still be carried openly even if they are not visible at all times.228 On the one
hand, this expresses the common-sense intuition that not all weapons must be
219. See Lieber Code, supra note 27, art. 20.
220. See generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE VERDICT OF BATTLE (2012) (charting the histori-
cal development of the idea of warfare as contest of violence, the outcome of which is binding on the
parties to the conflict).
221. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. 4(A)(2)(c); Huntley & Levitz, supra
note 217, at 485.
222. See DINSTEIN, supra note 27, at 35.
223. See ICRC, COMMENTARY TO THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 61.
224. See Hague Convention of 1899, supra note 39, art. 1.
225. See ICRC, COMMENTARY TO THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 61.
226. See DINSTE1N, supra note 27, at 45 (discussing whether the open arms requirement implies
"that a combatant is barred from carrying a sidearm in a holster or hand grenades in a pouch"-a ques-
tion that the author concludes "is plainly rhetorical"); SOLIS, supra note 5, at 196.
227. See ICRC, COMMENTARY TO THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 61.
228. Id.
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visible at all times, a requirement that does not accord with state practice.
22 9
Clearly, it is permissible to pack up weapons to transport them from one loca-
tion to the next-a common event for any military engagement. On the other
hand, concealing weapons while walking into an engagement, for the purposes
of feigning civilian status, is clearly prohibited. Pictet correctly observes that
carrying arms openly is not just a physical description but rather is tied to deep-
er prohibitions against perfidy and general requirements of attribution, though
the implications of this point are not explored.23°
Fritz Kalshoven agrees that carrying arms openly meant something
more than carrying arms "visibly. ' '231 In particular, Kalshoven concludes that
weapons need not be visible when out of sight of the enemy.232 In other words,
the relevant arms need only be visible when the soldiers are within eyesight of
the enemy; there is no requirement that arms should be visible when the sol-
diers are asleep in their barracks away from the front lines-an absurdly strict
interpretation.3 In his commentary, Bothe correctly notes that the drafters of
234the Additional Protocols disagreed over how to interpret this requirement .
On one view, arms should be visible only to the naked eye, while on the oppos-
ing view arms should be visible at night (due to infrared equipment) or even, at
235a far distance (due to binoculars). The latter view, taken to its logical ex-
treme, would suggest that arms should be visible at all times since modem ar-
mies can deploy spy airplanes and satellites to detect the enemy twenty-four
hours a day regardless of location. Given the technological advance of artifi-
cially enhanced visual detection, the visibility requirement would now appear
to be universal if one accepts this as a correct definition of the open arms re-
quirement.
All of these discussions miss the deeper and more important sense in
which the carrying of arms must be open. The requirement is closely connected
to the prohibition against perfidy, a foundational element of the chivalric code
236of honor. It demands that a soldier stand up and perform the act of killing
without hiding or deception, thereby taking responsibility for his or her actions.
229. See SOLIS, supra note 5, at 196 (citing Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 44(3)
("[H]e shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly:
(a) During each military engagement, and (b) During such time as he is visible to the adversary while he
is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate."))
(concluding that the weapon must be visible at times when the combatant is visible to the enemy).
230. See ICRC, COMMENTARY TO THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 61.
231. See FRITS KALSHOVEN, The Position of Guerilla Fighters Under the Law of War, in
REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW OF WAR 467, 486 (2007).
232. Id. at 486-87.
233. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 44(3) (linking the requirement o mo-
ments when a combatant is "visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment pre-
ceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate"); DINSTEIN, supra note 27, at 43; SOLIS,
supra note 5, at 196.
234. See MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:
COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949
287 (2d ed. 2013).
235. Id. at 289.
236. Cf Terry Gill, Chivalry: A Principle of the Law ofArmed Conflict?, in ARMED CONFLICT
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: IN SEARCH OF THE HUMAN FACE 33, 37 (Marielle Matthee et al. eds., 2013)
(discussing historical development of chivalry as a professional and legal norm).
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The prohibition on perfidy is not just limited to feigning civilian status in order
to draw the enemy closer-a tactic that is not only unfair but also unduly risks
future civilians who may be harmed because a soldier is unsure if he faces a
bona fide civilian or a threatening solider hiding in civilian dress.237 The prohi-
bition runs far deeper and is connected to the foundational notion that individu-
al soldiers fight and kill on behalf of the collective that they represent; the na-
tion advances and retrogrades with the soldier on the field and the soldier
embodies the civilians at home whose lives will be impacted by the results on
the battlefield.238
Recent military engagements in Ukraine are illustrative of this phenom-
enon. As Russian and Ukrainian officials negotiated over the political status of
the Crimean peninsula, which is formally part of Ukrainian sovereign territory,
military vehicles and personnel began showing up in key political and strategic
sites across Crimea.239 They would not identify themselves to reporters or local
civilians, and the Russian government said nothing about these deployments.
240
Although the soldiers wore uniforms that were unmistakably military in nature,
the clothing was stripped of all identifying insignia that established their link to
a particular nation-state or government. 24 Although it was widely assumed that
these forces were operating at the direction of the Kremlin, this conclusion was
242initially mere supposition. Eventually, Ukrainian forces departed from the
243Crimean peninsula and ceded the territory to Russian control. Western politi-
cal leaders criticized the development as an illegal annexation under the threat
of military force.244
237. DINSTEIN, supra note 27, at 35 ("Blurring the lines of division between combatants and
civilians is bound to end in civilians suffering the consequences of being suspected as covert combat-
ants.").
238. This is an ancient notion. See M.H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES
106 (1965) ("[T]he usual sign of such war was the display of the banner of the prince in whose name it
was fought. Once his banner was unfurled, he had given a challenge to combat and a state of war legally
existed. From this moment on, the laws of war were in force.").
239. See Andrew Higgins, Amid More Signs of Russian Force in Crimea, Delight Mixes With
Dismay, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/world/europe/tensions-rise-in
-crimean-capital-as-armed-men-continue-to-take-up-posts.html ("None of the heavily armed soldiers
had insignia on their green combat uniforms, and for days, Russia insisted that it was just a spectator to
the dramatic events unfolding in the Ukrainian region of Crimea and was as puzzled as everyone else by
the identities of masked gunmen who had seized Crimea's two main airports and its Parliament and
main government office buildings.").
240. Id.
241. See Mitch Potter, Ukraine Crisis: Russia's Gloves Come Off as the Insignia Go On,
TORONTO STAR, Mar. 1, 2014, http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/03/0l/ukraine-crisisrussias
.gloves come off as the insigniago on.html.
242. The implications of using troops without insignia is analyzed in Jens David Oblin, Crisis
in Crimea: Can Putin Claim Consent?, VERDICT (Mar. 8, 2014), http://verdict.justia.com/2014/03
/08/crisis-crimea-can-putin-claim-consent.
243. See Mark Memmott, Ukrainian Troops' Departure From Crimea Isn't a Simple Matter,
NPR (Mar. 20, 2014, 7:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/20/291757956/ukrainian
-troops-departure-from-crimea-isnt-a-simple-matter.
244. The concession was also accompanied by a referendum in which the local population,
most of whom were ethnic Russians, voted overwhelmingly in favor of leaving Ukraine and joining
Russia. David M. Herszenhorn, Crimea Votes to Secede From Ukraine as Russian Troops Keep Watch,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/worldleurope/crimea-ukraine
-secession-vote-referendum.html.
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The presence of military personnel of uncertain provenance in Ukraini-
an territory was deeply distressing. 245 Although the soldiers carried arms
"openly" in the sense that their rifles were visible for all to see, there was an
important sense in which the military deployment was not "open" at all.246 The
military forces and the Russian government wanted to obscure the relationship
between the forces and the political leaders who had ordered them there; per-
haps they did so in order to be able to enjoy plausible deniability if the military
and political situation soured quickly. Perhaps they wanted to preserve the op-
tion of arguing that the soldiers were, in fact, local militias organized by pro-
Russian residents of the Crimean region agitating for secession. Although this
was clearly not the case, the existence of a local, homegrown militia would
have been more favorable to Russia's political and legal argument that Crimea
should be allowed to secede from Ukraine.
247
The common-sense intuition that the Russian deployment was not
"open" is correct, though the standard commentaries fail to discuss the more
complex ways in which the deployment of military force is not open. In this
case, the arms were not carried openly because Russia was not making its in-
volvement clear. It was trying to obscure-in fact hide-that it was using mili-
tary force on foreign territory. And it was doing so not merely by traveling un-
der cover of darkness or operating with camouflage (two time-honored and
lawful techniques) but rather by removing the insignia that identified the troops
as belonging to the Russian Army. By doing so, it created a situation in which
Russia was not carrying arms openly in the collective sense.
In order to complete this argument, it is important to understand two lit-
tle-understood elements of the architecture of the laws of war. First, the princi-
ple of distinction is specific, not general: the duty to distinguish includes not
only the duty to separate soldiers from civilians but also the duty to separate
friendly from enemy soldiers, a process that implicitly requires acknowledge-
ment that force has been deployed.48 Second, the privilege of combatancy is
collective, not individual. It is based on criteria that can only be fulfilled by the
entire fighting force, not any single individual.249 Consequently, the privilege
can only be asserted by a collective on behalf of individuals-an operation
245. But see Ewen Macaskill, Russian Troops Removing ID Markings "Gross Violation, " THE
GUARDIAN: DEFENCE & SECURITY BLOG (Mar. 6, 2014, 10:56 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/news
/defence-and-security-blog/2014/mar/06/ukraine-gross-violation-russian-troops (explaining that IHL
experts criticize lack of insignia on troops, but ICRC officials claim that it is unclear whether this is a
violation of the Geneva Convention, saying, "we focus on humanitarian need, not to criticise or judge,
not to say who is right or wrong. There are different parties. We are very sensitive to this.").
246. See Ohlin, supra note 242.
247. In contrast to the quick developments in Crimea, the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine in
2014 developed slowly enough for local separatists to organize their own militia, albeit with covert lo-
gistical support and arms from Russia. See Interview by Bob Schieffer with John Kerry, Sec'y of State,
U.S. Dep't of State (July 20, 2014), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/07/229509.htm ("And
we know that the Russians have armed the separatists, trained the separatists, support the separatists, and
have to date, not publicly called on the separatists to stand down or to be part of this solution.").
248. See infra Section V.B.
249. See KALSHOVEN, supra note 231, at 487 (discussing the judicial determination that the
Front for the Liberation of Palestine collectively fails to carry arms openly, regardless of what any single
individual does).
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which is logically impaired by the state's refusal to acknowledge ownership of
the troops. Covert action and unacknowledged uses of force make it impossible
for the state to assert the privilege on one hand and then deny the existence of
the troops at the very same time.250 Each of these issues will now be addressed.
B. The Principle of Distinction is Specific, Not General
The twin requirements of carrying arms openly and wearing a fixed em-
blem both flow from the more general principle of distinction in the law of
war.251 The standard view is that the principle of distinction is designed to sepa-
rate, in the view of the enemy, combatants from civilians.252 Under this view,
the law of war is based on a basic gambit: soldiers are required to limit their at-
tacks to combatants and never kill civilians unless as collateral damage. Conse-
quently, soldiers are required to facilitate this requirement by distinguishing
themselves from protected civilians.2 53 The prohibition on perfidy also codifies
the rohibition on appearing as a civilian while engaging in acts of belligeren-
cy.254 The law's treatment of spies and saboteurs behind enemy lines (as crimi-
nals not entitled to the privilege) reflects the same intuition.25 5 Indeed, these el-
ements are intertwined as predicate elements of the general principle of
distinction; the law of war simply would not work if attacking forces were re-
quired to limit their attacks to soldiers but enemy soldiers were not required to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population. The resulting chaos, which
one typically finds in military engagements against partisans and terrorists,
would be the norm for all warfare.
256
This view of the scope of distinction is overly narrow. The duty to dis-
tinguish oneself is tied both to the requirements of wearing a fixed emblem and
carrying arms openly and is not limited to distinguishing oneself from civilians.
When viewed along with the prohibition against perfidy, it includes a more
250. One way of understanding this point is to view it as a principle of estoppel. See infra Sec-
tion V.C.
251. See ICRC, COMMENTARY TO THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 61 (explain-
ing that the rule is designed to preserve loyalty in fighting). For a discussion of this point, see LINDSEY
CAMERON & VINCENT CHETAIL, PRIVATIZING WAR: PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES
UNDER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 404 (2013) (linking insignia and carrying-arms-openly require-
ments with principle of distinction); DINSTEIN, supra note 27, at 43.
252. ICRC, CUSTOMARY IHL RULES, supra note 8, at 3 ("Rule 1. The parties to the conflict
must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants.").
253. Id. at 384 (Rule 106).
254. For a discussion of the scope of the prohibition on perfidy, see John Dehn, Permissible
Perfidy?: Analysing the Colombian Hostage Rescue, the Capture of Rebel Leaders and the World's Re-
action, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 627, 631-33 (2008) (discussing the origins of the prohibition against per-
fidy); see also Lieber Code, supra note 27, art. 101 ("While deception in war is admitted as a just and
necessary means of hostility, and is consistent with honorable warfare, the common law of war allows
even capital punishment for clandestine or treacherous attempts to injure an enemy, because they are so
dangerous, and it is difficult to guard against them.").
255. See infra notes 262, 267.
256. The frequency of terrorist attacks and military action against non-state actors may already
be pushing in that direction. For a discussion of the breakdown of traditional notions of reciprocity, see
generally MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, TORTURE, AND THE LAW OF WAR (2009)
(criticizing well-established justifications for reciprocity, and arguing that each fails to support a policy
of restraint in fighting al-Qaeda or similar non-state actors).
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general duty to make explicit on the battlefield the particular link between the
individual soldier and the collective on whose behalf he or she operates.257 In
other words, the duty to distinguish oneself-both from civilians and from oth-
er parties to the armed conflict-is not just an end to itself but is, rather, an in-
strumental imperative upon which the entire machinery ofjus in bello rests. In
the absence of proper attribution, none of the rules of jus in bello operates
smoothly. The most obvious example is that distinction is necessary for attribu-
tion of liability for war crimes, but in fact the instrumental reasons sweep much
broader and deeper.
More specifically, distinction is important for tactical, moral, political,
and diplomatic reasons. The tactical reason is that a soldier, when faced with an
unfamiliar soldier, must quickly assess whether he is an enemy soldier, a sol-
dier from his own military force, or a soldier from a friendly co-belligerent
force.258 This is a far more complex assessment than simply determining com-
batant versus civilian status and will help determine whether or not the soldier
will engage the approaching individual. In other words, the assessment of the
approaching individual as friendly or not requires identifying the particular
fighting force one is confronting on the battlefield. Indeed, this view is clearly
implicit in the prohibition on perfidy. A soldier is guilty of perfidious conduct
if he infiltrates an enemy position while wearing the uniform of his enemy in
259order to launch a surprise attack.
The standard texts do not always recognize this broad understanding of
distinction and it is common to hear scholars express a narrower version. For
example, Dinstein correctly notes that having a fixed emblem "is predicated on
the two-pronged requirement of distinctiveness (viz. it must identify and char-
acterize the armed force using it)," though he then goes on to conclude that
wearing a standard uniform "with all proper insignia ... is not strictly neces-
sary" without apparent awareness of the tension between these two state-
ments.260 He then notes, as others frequently do, that special forces often wear
non-standard uniforms, a process that he finds "unobjectionable" as long as the
combatants are distinguishable from civilians.261 Parks holds a similar view,
262
arguing that a non-standard uniform for special forces is permissible. Alt-
257. Provost concludes that he normative basis for protection by the principle of distinction
and other humanitarian principles is membership in a group. See REN PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 42 (2004).
258. For a discussion of perfidy, see Yves Sandoz, Land Warfare, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 91, 98 (Andrew Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014).
259. See ICRC, CUSTOMARY JHL RULES, supra note 8, at 213 ("Rule 62. Improper use of the
flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of the adversary is prohibited."). The ICRC study de-
scribes this as a rule 'of IHL but also notes that "[i]t can be argued that it should also apply in non-
international armed conflicts when the parties to the conflict do in fact wear uniforms." Id. at 214.
260. DrNSTEIN, supra note 27, at 43.
261. Id.
262. See W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L.
493, 525 (2003) (arguing that state practice supports deployment of special forces in civilian attire or
non-standard uniforms). Indeed, Parks concludes that "state practice reflects an overt tolerance border-
ing on admiration for special forces wearing civilian clothing when working with indigenous persons in
enemy-denied areas, whether for intelligence gathering or combat operations." Id. However, Parks also
concedes that special forces wearing civilian attire have traditionally been treated as spies upon capture.
Id. This implies by logical deduction that they are unprivileged combatants.
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hough plenty of texts view distinction as merely a question of combatants ver-
sus civilians, its underlying rationale requires that soldiers identify themselves
263as belonging to a particular political entity on whose behalf they fight. Noth-
ing short of this level of identification will provide an enemy soldier with suffi-
cient information to determine whether the approaching individual is friend or
foe, whether the approaching individual should be shot or welcomed.
Indeed, the entire concept of distinction is collective, and specific to a
particular force on whose behalf the individual fights, because there is no such
thing as being a combatant in abstracto. The narrow view of distinction fails to
recognize this reality. Combatants are always fighting with a particular group,
and the law of war ties the requirements of lawful belligerency to elements that
can only be satisfied by a group (command structure, the group's obeying the
customs of war, etc.).264 To be a lawful combatant is to be fighting with, and on
behalf of other individuals, brought together in the right way and recognized by
the law of war as a fighting organization. This is precisely why the duty to wear
a fixed emblem and carry arms openly, and the associated prohibition on perfi-
dy, all require soldiers to be positively linked to a particular fighting force.
Applying this insight to the use of covert action, it becomes clear why
an unacknowledged use of force is so problematic. The issue is more than just
uniforms, emblems, and insignias. The cluster of IHL requirements discussed
above requires a conceptual and political link between the soldier and a collec-
tive force, but covert and unacknowledged uses of force seek to evade--or in
fact explicitly deny-that connection.265 This produces more than just a ten-
sion-it produces a downright contradiction. In order to be identified with a
particular fighting force and meet he requirements of carrying arms openly, the
soldier must be identified as fighting on behalf of a collective, a link that is ex-
266plicitly denied in covert action. The result is a logical contradiction. The best
resolution of this paradox is to concede that soldiers engaged in covert action
do not meet the standards for carrying their arms openly because the operative
link to state responsibility is negated by the covert nature of the action. Alt-
hough this conclusion may seem surprising and counterintuitive, the basic
structure of the argument is sound. Soldiers engaged in covert action do not
meet the basic standards for lawful belligerency and therefore are not entitled to
the privilege of combatancy. If captured in enemy territory they may be prose-
cuted for violations of domestic criminal law. Furthermore, the fact that the
soldiers in question are wearing military uniforms, or even belong to the uni-
formed Armed Services, does not change this result.267 Even uniformed mili-
263. See DINSTEIN, supra note 27, at 43. Dinstein also concludes that all military vehicles must
be properly identified. See id. at 45.
264. See KALSHOVEN, supra note 231, at 487.
265. But see Huntley & Levitz, supra note 217, at 485-86 (arguing for broad application of the
combatant's privilege for "surrogate" armed forces).
266. Id. at 492 (noting that "the most serious jus in bello challenge in clandestine and UW [un-
conventional warfare] operations (and one that would somewhat limit surrogate activities) is the princi-
ple of distinction").
267. It is important to remember that the functional requirements of belligerency apply, by cus-
tom, to the regular armed forces. See ICRC, CUSTOMARY IHL RULES, supra note 8, at 385 ("Several
military manuals remark that the obligation to distinguish oneself does not pose a problem for the regu-
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 40: 337
tary forces, such as Navy SEALs, do not have the privilege of combatancy
when engaged in covert action under Title 50, simply because the required link
between the soldier and the fighting force is negated by the covert status of the
engagement.
268
C. The Privilege is Collective, Not Individual
The final piece of the argument involves the collective nature of the privi-
lege of combatancy. The standard assumption is that the privilege belongs to
the individual combatant. The privilege operates as an immunity that trans-
forms what would otherwise be an unlawful act of murder into a lawful act of
belligerency, by virtue of the fact that the soldier is a legitimate belligerent.269
In other words, the privilege is a legal trump that blocks foreign powers from
prosecuting an individual soldier for acts of lawful belligerency during armed
conflict.270 Like other legal trumps that protect individuals from government
action, it is tempting to conceptualize the privilege as an individual right
against collective action on behalf of a state.71
While tempting, this approach is misleading and incorrect. The privilege
is collective in nature because it belongs primarily to the fighting force engaged
in the armed conflict. There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, the
privilege only applies if there is an armed conflict, which by definition involves
a contest between organized armed groups that constitute the parties to the
armed conflict.272 Without the parties there is no armed conflict; without an
armed conflict there is no privilege of belligerency. Second, the criteria for
POW status and the associated privilege are all group criteria: the group must
wear a fixed emblem, carry arms openly, and comply with the laws of war.
273
lar armed forces because it is 'customary' or 'usual' for members of the regular armed forces to wear a
uniform as a distinctive sign. If members of regular armed forces do not wear a uniform, they risk being
charged as spies or saboteurs."). For a full defense of this conclusion, see supra Section I.B.
268. See Alston, supra note 212, at 369-70 (describing lack of privilege in most covert actions).
It should be noted that the unprivileged nature of the deployment does not, by itself, entail that the use of
force is unlawful from the perspective ofjus ad bellum. See Marty Lederman, Unprivileged Does Not
Mean Prohibited, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 26, 2013, 2:05 PM), http://justsecurity.org/l 153
/unprivilegedunlawful (concluding that unprivileged belligerents violate domestic criminal law).
269. See Miriam J. Aukerman, War, Crime, or War Crime? Interrogating the Analogy Between
War and Terror, in ENEMY COMBATANTS, TERRORISM, AND ARMED CONFLICT LAW 145, 147 (David
K. Linnan ed., 2008) (describing membership in a fighting collective as a necessary condition for apply-
ing the privilege).
270. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 188-97 (1977) (defining a political
right as a trump against public welfare arguments or general utilitarian justifications).
271. Id.
272. The modem definition of armed conflict was articulated by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), which defines armed con-
flict as "protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a state." For a discussion, see CULLEN, supra note 31, at 27;
SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 13, at 170 (discussing organizational requirements for armed conflict); Ste-
ven Haines, The Nature of War and the Character of Contemporary Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 9, 10 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012); and How is the
Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS
(Mar. 2008), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
273. See supra Section I.A.
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Consider a single individual who complies with these requirements but fights
for an organization that fails to meet them. The individual fights for a terrorist
organization but the single individual decides to wear a uniform, carries his
arms openly, and limits his attacks to enemy soldiers and refuses to target inno-
cent civilians.274 As much as this individual is commendable, he would not be
eligible for POW status or the associated privilege, since the group to which he
belongs does not meet the standard.275 And with good reason: if the group in
general does not meet the requirements, then the other party to the armed con-
flict cannot conduct its military operations with the security of knowing that its
counterparts are complying with the basic structure of the law of war. Rather,
they would need to proceed with the knowledge that most of the enemy is mix-
ing with the civilian population and not carrying arms openly. The fact that one
individual soldier (or even several soldiers) is complying with the rules is not
enough to change the situation. Third, the collective nature of the privilege is
confirmed by the bare text of the Third Geneva Convention, which requires
belligerents to be afforded POW status when "militias or volunteer corps, in-
cluding such organized resistance movements, fulfill [certain] conditions.276 In
other words, one looks to the group's compliance with the functional criteria to
determine if its members are entitled to the privilege.277
Finally, the privilege of combatancy is an implicit obligation between
parties to the armed conflict that they will respect offers of surrender, grant
POW status, and defer prosecution of enemy soldiers for lawful acts of bellig-
erency.278 These obligations run between the collectives themselves, not from
the collective to the soldier himself.279 At most, the individual soldier is a third-
party beneficiary whose welfare is very much at stake in the performance or
non-performance of these obligations. 28 If a state violates its obligations and
mistreats or prosecutes an enemy soldier, then we conclude that the soldier's
state has been victimized by an internationally wrongful act. The collective
analysis goes further. It is impossible to understand the combatant's privilege
unless the collective asserts it on behalf of the individual. The collective must
assert that he individual is fighting on its behalf and deserves the treatment re-
quired by the law of war, but only after the collective recognizes the existence
of an armed conflict with soldiers fighting on behalf of two collectives.
281
This explains why covert action is incompatible with the combatant's
274. See, e.g., Status of Taliban Forces Under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of
1949, Op. Off. Legal Counsel, 2002 WL 34462404 (Feb. 7, 2002) (engaging in collective analysis
though controversially concluding that President alone can make determination).
275. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 2002) (analyzing or-
ganizational criteria to determine petitioner's claim to POW status).
276. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 25, art. 4(2).
277. This requires a difficult practice of line drawing if the group is a mixture of compliant and
non-compliant forces. What percentage of compliance is required to meet the Article 4 standard? There
are no easy and non-arbitrary answers to this question, but in any event this problem is unavoidable and
should not be counted as a deficit of the theory presented in this Article.
278. See THOMAs BATY & JOHN H. MORGAN, WAR: ITS CONDUCT AND LEGAL RESULTS 172
(1915) (explaining the collective nature of conflict).
279. Id.
280. See PROVOST, supra note 257, at 42.
281. Cf. Dormann, supra note 5, at 268-69.
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privilege. Since a state must acknowledge the existence of the armed conflict
and the soldiers fighting on its behalf, the existence of the covert action be-
comes a logical bar to the invocation of the privilege.282 One way of explaining
the point is to think of it as a form of estoppel.283 A state cannot refuse to
acknowledge the use of force and then claim that the soldiers who fought in the
military engagement are entitled to the privilege.284 Once the state denies that
the military action was taken on its behalf, it is then estopped from claiming
that the soldiers are part of a privileged fighting force.2 8' Or, put the opposite
way, once the state asserts the privilege on behalf of its forces, it is estopped
from denying responsibility for the military incursion.286 It must stand up and
carry its arms openly. The structure of the privilege is similar to diplomatic
immunity, which must be asserted by a state on behalf of the individual, and in
theory can be waived by the state if so desired (even to the detriment of the in-
dividual criminal defendant).2 87 Furthermore, any violation of diplomatic im-
munity is a matter of international concern to be resolved by the states in-
volved.288
All three arguments presented in this Part must be viewed together be-
cause they form an interrelated cluster of obligations. Military forces must wear
a distinctive emblem and carry their arms openly because the principle of dis-
tinction requires the identification of combatants with a particular fighting
force; the collective itself asserts the privilege and can only do so when it
acknowledges that the troops were operating on its behalf. When applied to the
deployment of drones in a conflict with a non-state actor, it becomes clear that
282. Indeed, the Department of Defense does not officially acknowledge that JSOC commands
various special mission units or that its primary mission is "identifying and destroying terrorist and ter-
ror cells worldwide." ANDREW FEICKERT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21048 U.S. SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF): BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2013), http://www.au.af.mil
/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rs2I048.pdf.
283. See RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE 705
(11 th ed. 2014) (discussing equitable principle of estoppel); see generally HENRY MORRISON HERMAN,
THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL (Albany, W.C. Little & Co. 1871) (cataloguing a variety of estoppel arguments
in the common law).
284. The principle of estoppel unquestionably applies in intemational law. See ANTHONY AUST,
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2d ed. 2010). But see BROWNLIE, supra note 77, at 644 (recog-
nizing that the principle of estoppel is undeniably a part of international law but also complaining that
"the 'principle' has no particular coherence in international law, its incidence and effects not being uni-
form").
285. For applications of estoppel in the context of armed conflict, consider the arguments raised
by al-Nashiri's counsel in federal court that the U.S. government was precluded from asserting the exist-
ence of an armed conflict with al-Qaeda in 2000 because President Clinton stated publicly that the coun-
try was not at war. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 18, AI-Nashiri v. Obama, No. 08-CIV-1207 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2014); see also CHRISTOPHER H.
PYLE & RICHARD M. PIOUS, THE CONSTITUTION UNDER SIEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER VERSUS THE
RULE OF LAW 230 (2010).
286. The principle of estoppel is frequently applied in international litigation. See, e.g., Temple
of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 32 (June 15) (concluding that Thailand was es-
topped by conduct from claiming invalidity of treaty); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 412-13 (Nov. 26) (showing acceptance of court's jurisdic-
tion via estoppel).
287. See generally EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (3d ed. 2008) (surveying the privileges and immunities of
diplomatic officers).
288. Id.
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drone operators do not enjoy the privilege of combatancy when the force is
covert and unacknowledged. Despite popular belief, this conclusion has little to
do with whether the operators are CIA employees or uniformed members of the
armed services.289 Even uniformed members of the military are not entitled to
the privilege if the United States is acting covertly and refuses to acknowledge
an operative link to the soldiers.290 Whatever the reasons for moving control
over drone deployment from the CIA to the Department of Defense, the privi-
lege of combatancy is not one of them, as long as the strikes are conducted in a
covert posture.
The loss of the combatant's privilege for drone operators, including uni-
formed members of the Armed Services, may not be particularly disturbing for
the U.S. government.2 9 In many cases the reason for the covert nature of the
deployment may be that the United States is operating with the consent of the
local government but that consent is predicated on U.S. non-acknowledgment
of military participation in the local theater of war.292 In that case it is unlikely
that the local government would prosecute U.S. service members even in the
293absence of the combatant's privilege. The agreement or understanding be-
tween the states may even include a promise that the host state will not prose-
cute American service members under its domestic law. Even in the absence of
an explicit agreement, the prosecution of an American service member would
reveal the very foreign assistance that the host state is hoping to conceal, thus
making a prosecution counterproductive and unlikely.
However, there are still reasons to care about the loss of the combatant's
privilege. First, it reveals that the decision to place control over paramilitary
operations in CIA or Defense Department control should be made on the basis
of other legal and policy considerations, not the combatant's privilege. Second,
if the local government is overthrown by the rebels, or even changes admin-
istrations, the new government may not honor the original agreement, thus
making the privilege pertinent again. Third, individual combatants might care
whether they carry the combatant's privilege-a fact that may alter their psy-
chological attitude regarding their conduct.294 Finally, the basic structure and
scope of the privilege is central to the conceptual architecture of the law of war
and ought to be properly understood, independent of its consequences for any
particular strategic debate.
289. See Burt & Wagner, supra note 208, at 11.
290. See supra notes 252-268 and accompanying text.
291. For a discussion of the U.S. government position, and a critique of it, see Scott Horton,
The Trouble with Drones, HARPER'S MAG.: BROWSINGS (May 3, 2010, 12:37 PM),
http://harpers.org/blog/2010/05/the-trouble-with-drones (noting that the real problem with using unprivi-
leged drone operators is U.S. hypocrisy).
292. See Lederman, supra note 194 (discussing reasons for non-acknowledgment).
293. Some of these factors are discussed in MAZZETTI, supra note 196, at 196.
294. See also Mdgret, supra note 74, at 529 (discussing psychological elements of combatant's
privilege in the NIAC context).
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 40: 337
D. Retroactive Acknowledgment
Prior Sections highlighted, but did not resolve, the problems posed by ret-
roactive acknowledgment. In some cases a state may deploy force that is covert
and unacknowledged at the time the force is deployed, but then at a later point
in time the state might officially acknowledge the force. In particular, this pro-
cedure might be attractive to a state that is unsure of how the deployment will
unfold, both in terms of strategic outcomes and the degree of IHL violations
that occur during the deployment. If the operation goes poorly, the state might
continue to disavow any knowledge of the operation. On the other hand, if the
operation is a strategic success (and if collateral damage is minimized), the
state may wish to acknowledge the deployment after the fact. The acknowl-
edgment might come years later or it might come in a matter of hours or days.
The Navy SEAL raid on Osama Bin Laden's compound is just one example.
Had the raid gone poorly, it is entirely conceivable that the United States might
have denied involvement. As it happens, the raid was a success and government
officials were happy to take credit for the operation.
There is a further complication here that becomes apparent only when
the temporal issue is analyzed. What is the definition of "unacknowledged,"
and does governmental silence always qualify as a denial of involvement? In
other words, a government may refuse to confirm or deny that the operation
was state sanctioned. In that case it seems clear that it is unacknowledged, but
what if no one asks the, state about the deployment because its existence was
completely-or mostly-a well-kept secret? If no one asks, the government's
silence could be construed as evidence of non-acknowledgment or simply as
evidence of the operation's clandestine (i.e., secret) nature. In some cases, the
state's internal legal structure, such as Title 10 or Title 50 of the U.S. Code,
may provide a reasonable proxy for whether the government is willing to
acknowledge the force if asked for more information about the operation. Un-
fortunately, not every state has segregated legal mechanisms for acknowledged
and unacknowledged legal mechanisms, and even in the United States, the op-
eration's authorization under Title 10 and the auspices of the Department of
Defense is no guarantee that the government will officially acknowledge its
role in the military operation if and when it is asked.
One possible solution to the temporal problem is to insist that the state
acknowledge the force at the time when the force is being deployed. This view
solves the temporal problem and is best supported by the broad interpretation of
the open arms requirement discussed above. If the state does not acknowledge
the force when it is deployed, then the force is not "open." Indeed, retroactive
acknowledgment fails to cure the violation of the open arms requirement, just
as retroactive statements could not solve any other violation of the functional
requirements of belligerency. This view is also supported by the needs of indi-
vidual soldiers with regard to the principle of distinction. To the soldier in
Eastern Ukraine or Crimea trying to figure out what to do, it matters little
whether or not the Russian government retroactively acknowledges that the
military troops that operated there, in the distant past, were deployed on Rus-
sia's behalf. Indeed, even a retroactive acknowledgment shortly after the de-
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ployment is irrelevant from the perspective of the individual soldier operating
in that environment.
Unfortunately, none of this solves the conundrum involved in state si-
lence after an operation that remains a well-kept secret. One plausible answer
to this question is that it should be classified as clandestine force but not
unacknowledged force. Acknowledgment or lack of acknowledgment presumes
that the world knows about the military force and starts asking questions about
who is behind it. If the force is truly secret, the issue of acknowledgement or
lack of acknowledgment never arises. On the other hand, if the kinetic attack is
known publicly, and the state is asked about the attack, and the state either de-
nies its involvement or refuses to answer the question, then it constitutes
unacknowledged force. Under this standard, the military campaigns by the Rus-
sians in Crimea, the Americans in Yemen, and the Americans in the tribal re-
gions of Pakistan all qualify as unacknowledged force because when asked ex-
plicitly about state involvement, government officials either denied
involvement or refused to answer the question.
This standard leaves unresolved the status of isolated and very brief op-
erations that are "one-off' deployments that happen once and are not repeated.
The standard expressed above does not address these limited scenarios. In these
cases, the operation begins and ends before the public has a chance to ask the
government about the operation. It is unclear whether or not these quick de-
ployments should count as unacknowledged or not. But uncertainty about the
application of the basic principles to that limited factual scenario should not
cloud the certainty of our judgments in the more typical case: a lengthy military
campaign with repeat deployments that remain unacknowledged by the gov-
ernment, during the course of the campaign, when asked about state involve-
ment. This was certainly the case with regard to Putin's refusal to acknowledge
operations in Crimea, and Obama's unwillingness to acknowledge operations in
Yemen and Pakistan while those operations were ongoing. Questions were
asked; answers were either not given (Obama) or were deceptive (Putin). In
each case, the unacknowledged nature of the force prevented the military op-
eratives from fulfilling the open arms requirement, and no amount of retroac-
tive acknowledgment, years later, will cure this fact.
E. Mixed Deployment of Complex Weapons Platforms
The prior Sections of Part V argued that covert actions are-by defini-
tion-inconsistent with the underlying functional requirements for the privilege
of belligerency. The argument had two crucial elements. First, a state cannot
assert the privilege on behalf of its troops and at the same time deny that the
troops acted on its behalf. Second, unacknowledged force violates the open
arms requirement and frustrates the principle of distinction underlying it. This
suggests that even uniformed military personnel engaged in covert action are
not entitled to the privilege. However, we have yet to address an important fac-
tual complication: uniformed and non-uniformed personnel working in tandem
jointly conduct some drone operations. In many cases, uniformed troops who
usually operate under Title 10 are co-deployed with CIA personnel in a covert
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action that is best described either as a Title 50 action or a "hybrid" Ti-
295tlel0/Title 50 action. How should such mixed operations be analyzed under
the law of war?
Discussions regarding drone operations often assume that control over
their deployment is an either/or option between the intelligence agencies and
the Department of Defense. In truth, the reality is far more complicated. Pub-
lished reports indicate that even in cases where the CIA is in control of drone
deployment in a particular theater of war, uniformed Air Force personnel some-
times handle the actual piloting of the drones. So the reality is that a mix of in-
telligence and uniformed agents handle drone operations, and there is substan-
tial reason to believe that such hybrid deployments will become more-rather
than less-common as interagency cooperation and harmonization continue to
develop.296 Legal discussion has lagged far behind these factual developments.
Consequently, this Part will trace the legal consequences for the combatant's
privilege in hybrid deployments of uniformed and non-uniformed intelligence
297personnel.
In particular, it is unclear what it means to "carry arms openly" in situa-
tions where the weapons system is a complex platform with tens or even hun-
dreds of individuals participating in its deployment. The standard textbook dis-
cussions of carrying arms openly deal with rifles, side-arms, and grenades, but
little to no discussion of aircraft carriers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, or
remotely piloted vehicles-weapons whose complexity dwarfs the previous
generation of weapons like rifles and grenades.298 Also, the standard discus-
sions are infantry-based with little to no attention to how the norm applies to
combat scenarios in other branches of the armed services or other modes of
combat.
At least part of the uncertainty regarding application of the open arms
standard stems from the remoteness of drones, which can be deployed from
great distances and out of the visual range of the enemy (unless the enemy has
299radar or satellites). Of course, this is not a new phenomenon; snipers have
always operated at a distance, and although they put pressure on the chivalric
culture of warfare, state practice permits them.300 In similar fashion, cruise mis-
siles, artillery shells, and long-range bombers all involve action at a distance
295. One might describe hybrid Title 10/Title 50 actions as an attempt by the executive branch
to "pool" the legal authority that normally resides in the Department of Defense and the CIA. See Daph-
na Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 228 (2015).
296. Chesney, supra note 15, at 540.
297. But see BOOTHBY, supra note 150, at 287 (discussing the legal issue for an unmanned aer-
ial vehicle of whether the controller "has the required status for the activities he undertakes").
298. For a discussion of the complexity of deploying modem weapons (and platforms), see
generally CHRIS C. DEMCHAK, MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, COMPLEX MACHINES: MODERNIZATION tN
THE U.S. ARMED SERVICES (1991).
299. See generally Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, 1
HARV. NAT'L SECURITY J. 145 (2010) (discussing the policy implications of using remotely piloted ve-
hicles to kill enemy combatants without substantial risk to attacking forces).
300. Francis Lieber viewed snipers behind enemy lines as arguably unprivileged, even if wear-
ing a uniform. See Lieber Code, supra note 27, art. 84. For a discussion of Lieber's complex treatment
of snipers, see Burrus M. Camahan, The Civil War Origins of the Modem Rules of War: Francis Lieber
and Lincoln's General Order No. 100, 39 N. KEN. L. REV. 661, 675-76 (2012).
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deployed by teams of combatants.30 1 The particular issue for debate here is the
involvement of both CIA and Defense Department personnel in the execution
of a drone strike. How does one assess the legality of CIA involvement in a
drone piloted by Air Force personnel?30 2 If Air Force personnel comply with
the basic standards of belligerency while the CIA personnel do not, is the drone
strike an example of privileged belligerency or not?
One possible resolution to the debate is to view CIA employees engaged
in paramilitary operations, especially drone targeting and deployment, as auxil-
iary members of the armed forces in accordance with Article 43 of Additional
Protocol I.303 Although this is a promising argument, there are multiple obsta-
304
cles here. First, it appears the United States has never openly identified the
CIA as an incorporated paramilitary force in accordance with Article 43.3o5
Second, Additional Protocol I applies in international conflicts, and it is unclear
which conclusion should be drawn from the lack of a corresponding provision
for non-international conflicts in Protocol II. This could mean that such incor-
porations are prohibited in non-international conflicts or that they are permit-
ted. Third, the discussion of the provision at Geneva centered on military police
and other units designed to provide "internal law-keeping," as opposed to cov-
ert paramilitary actors.3 °6 In fact, the section title of the ICRC commentary lists
paragraph 3 as "Incorporation of police forces," and its discussion concludes
with the narrow suggestion that "uniformed units of law enforcement agencies
can be members of the armed forces if the adverse Party has been notified of
this, so that there is no confusion on its part.,30 7 It is therefore plausible that
members of the U.S. Armed Services military police are incorporated into the
armed services because they follow the Department of Defense's unified chain
308of command. In contrast, CIA paramilitary forces operate outside of the
armed forces chain of command, thereby complicating any attempt to classify
them as auxiliary members of the armed forces.
309
301. See, e.g., BRIAN A. JACKSON ET AL., EVALUATING NOVEL THREATS TO THE HOMELAND:
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND CRUISE MISSILES 45 (2008).
302. For a discussion of these reported collaborations, see Chris Woods, CIA "s Pakistan Drone
Strikes Carried Out by Regular US Air Force Personnel, GUARDIAN, Apr. 14, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/14/cia-drones-pakistan-us-air-force-documentary (suggest-
ing that Air Force personnel located in Nevada operate CIA drones in Pakistan).
303. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 43(3) ("Whenever a Party to a conflict incor-
porates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other
Parties to the conflict.").
304. The argument is discussed at length in Henderson, supra note 32, at 152 (asking whether
the CIA could be considered an incorporated paramilitary adjunct to the regular armed forces).
305. Cf id. (suggesting that no international rule prohibits governments from deciding which
force they use to fight local insurgents in a non-international conflict); see generally Kenneth Watkin,
Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy 65-
66 (Harvard Univ. Program on Humanitarian Policy & Conflict Research, Occasional Paper Series 2,
2005) (discussing overlap between military and security operations in non-international conflicts).
306. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 517 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
307. Id. at 518.
308. See also ICRC, CUSTOMARY IHL RULES, supra note 8, at 16-17 (incorporating substantial
state practice of police forces into armed forces).
309. See CIA Organization Chart, U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (2014),
https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/leadership/ciaorgchart.pdf.
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Another possibility is that the privilege is personal to each individual
involved in the drone strike, such that Defense Department employees are
privileged, whereas CIA officers are not. While seemingly plausible, this con-
clusion is deeply problematic. In conducting their operations, the uniformed
members of the army are required by customary law to carry their arms open-
ly, but in this case the uniformed members are "co-carrying" the weapon
with unprivileged belligerents who are not carrying arms openly. There is al-
most no discussion in the literature regarding the "co-deployment" of weapons;
every textbook assumes that weapons are personally deployed-an antiquated
and erroneous assumption.31 1 In today's technologically advanced battlefield,
soldiers cooperate and carry weapons in common as a joint cooperative activi-
ty. 312
This suggests that the privilege should be assessed collectively among
all members who cooperate in the joint deployment of the weapon; they are, in
a sense, "co-carrying" the weapon together. There is little in the law of armed
conflict literature on the nature of co-deployment, but the most plausible ac-
count of such co-deployment is that the members are engaged in a joint cooper-
ative activity.313 As I have explained elsewhere, the sine qua non of a joint co-
operative activity is a joint or shared intuition to carry out the act in question.3 14
A joint or shared intuition is created when multiple individuals each have an
intention that the group carry out the action based on aplan.315 Inevitably these
plans require what Bratman refers to as the "meshing of sub-plans," i.e., an ap-
propriate division of labor and a decision procedure for resolving uncertainties
316or disagreements about how to proceed. The joint deployment of a complex
weapons system meets these criteria. In that situation, CIA employees and Air
Force personnel engage in the joint cooperative activity of launching a drone
strike.
Under this view, there is at least a plausible argument that American
service members are not "carrying their arms" openly because they are jointly
deploying the drone with members of a covert paramilitary force who do not
meet the standards for lawful belligerency.317 In theory, it does not matter how
many CIA officers are involved in the drone deployment, as long as there is a
significant number of CIA employees engaged in the joint cooperative activity.
310. See supra Section I.B (explicitly defending this conclusion).
311. See, e.g., BOTHE ET AL., supra note 234, at 288-89.
312. The term "joint or shared cooperative activity" comes from Bratman's work. See MICHAEL
E. BRATMAN, Shared Cooperative Activity, in FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION
AND AGENCY 93, 93-108 (1999).
313. Id. at 94.
314. For an exploration of this issue as it pertains to international criminal law, see Jens David
Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 693, 735 (2011) (applying
joint or shared intentions as a framework for mode of liability for cooperative criminal actions).
315. BRATMAN, supra note 312, at 61 (discussing the significance of plans in a rational agen-
cy).
316. Id. at 100.
317. See Woods, supra note 302; see also Aaron M. Drake, Current U.S. Air Force Drone Op-
erations and Their Conduct in Compliance with International Humanitarian Law-An Overview, 39
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 629, 633 (2011) (discussing questions raised by CIA involvement in Air
Force drone deployments).
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At some point the number of CIA individuals might drop so low as to become
de minimis, though that threshold is difficult to quantify. But the issue need not
be resolved here; it is sufficient to note that broad CIA joint deployment of a
drone with uniformed military officers is sufficiently covert to negate the privi-
lege for all individuals involved in the deployment.
One crucial aspect is to correctly identify the scope of the drone "de-
ployment" and the associated joint cooperative activity.318 The scope can be
drawn too narrowly or too broadly. For example, defining the joint cooperative
activity as "the strategy of defeating the enemy with military force" would
clearly be too broad and would generate the fallacious conclusion that any CIA
involvement during an armed conflict would destroy the privilege for the en-
tirety of the conflict. On the other hand, it would be just as fallacious to suggest
that the relevant joint cooperative activity is some time-sliced micro-event with
CIA involvement, such that the drone is deployed solely by Air Force person-
nel as long as they press the button that launches the missile at the very end of
the event.319 Clearly, "deploying" a drone is a much more extensive process
than merely pressing the button that fires the missile. The truth lays somewhere
in between. One should take guidance from the operational definition of de-
ployment-encompassing the takeoff, flight, missile launch, and landing-in
order to understand the correct scope of the joint cooperative activity.320 As
long as CIA personnel are involved in this process, the co-deployment is not an
example of carrying arms openly.
However, it would be wrong to assume that CIA participation in target
selection and intelligence gathering more generally negates the privilege of
combatancy. The existence of behind-the-scenes intelligence operations is a
part of any military campaign.321 Intelligence gathering includes enemy mili-
tary capabilities, surveillance of civilian personnel, and identification of strate-
gic targets.322 In almost every state, intelligence units located either in the
armed services or in a separate intelligence agency traditionally perform these
activities. Regardless of their location within the government, however, these
units rarely wear uniforms while engaged in covert or forward deployment on
enemy territory.323 Such activities are ancillary to, but not a part of the deploy-
ment of any particular weapons system. Therefore, the existence of prior un-
privileged intelligence operations, laying the preparatory work for later target-
ing, does not by itself make the intelligence operatives "co-deployers" of the
318. For a good description of drone deployments, see Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Attacks Un-
der the Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: Clearing the 'Fog of Law,' 13 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L.
311, 313-14 (2010).
319. See Drake, supra note 317, at 639 (discussing role of intelligence analysts in drone de-
ployments).
320. Id. at 637-40.
321. See, e.g., Len Scott, British Strategic Intelligence and the Cold War, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE 138, 143 (Loch K. Johnson ed., 2010) (discussing
British covert action and intelligence gathering after World War II).
322. For a general description of intelligence gathering, see Loch K. Johnson, National Security
Intelligence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE 3, 5-6 (Loch K. John-
son ed., 2010).
323. Id. at 13-14.
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weapons with the uniformed soldiers who later launch the ordinances. As long
as the intelligence operatives are engaged in this type of ancillary work, the
uniformed members who deploy the system retain their privilege of combatan-
cy.
CONCLUSION
This Article elucidates a series of unorthodox positions regarding the
combatant's privilege: that it applies in some non-international conflicts, that
armed forces and not just militias are required to meet the four functional re-
quirements for lawful belligerency, that non-state actors might qualify for the
privilege if they fulfill the functional requirements, and that covert action is
logically inconsistent with the privilege regardless of whether the deployment
involves uniformed armed forces or covert operatives. Each of these conclu-
sions departs significantly from repeated orthodoxy: the privilege is inapplica-
ble in all non-international conflicts, regular armed forces are exempt from the
functional requirements of belligerency, non-state actors can never be privi-
leged, and uniformed soldiers are entitled to the privilege in covert actions.
Although the unorthodox positions defended in this Article depart signifi-
cantly from the current literature and from received wisdom among state offi-
cials, near-universal agreement on a legal position is not, by itself, evidence of
its correctness; each conclusion in this Article is justified once the basic struc-
ture of the laws of war is properly interrogated. History plays a large role in the
argument: in particular the rich treatment of non-international conflicts by nine-
teenth-century scholars, as well as the complex state practice arising out of the
U.S. Civil War. The Article also augments the standard fare of treaties and state
practice with a heavy dose of conceptual argument. However, the disparate
methodologies are not unconnected. The historical argument regarding the
nineteenth century view is intended to clarify the preexisting legal framework
preserved by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The applicability
of the functional criteria to regular armed forces is based, in part, on state prac-
tice and the lack of customary ascension to state forces that do not meet the cri-
teria. Finally, the interpretation of the open arms and emblem requirements in
the Third Geneva Convention depends on a conceptual analysis of their rela-
tionship to the principle of distinction and the nature of covert action-an un-
der-theorized but increasingly urgent issue in asymmetric conflicts.
